Vehicle emission legislation in the EU recently attained high levels of public attention in connection with the “diesel scandal”. The present political science study examines various cases of European and national legislation, providing explanations for both the level of ambition of environmental rules and regulatory failures in this sector.

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volume 8
Beyond “Trading up”: Environmental Federalism in the European Union

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