



Ebru Turhan [ed.]

German-Turkish Relations Revisited

The European Dimension, Domestic and
Foreign Politics and Transnational Dynamics



Nomos

EU-Turkey relations have a long historic trajectory. Turkey is in future likely to remain, despite political tensions, an important country for the EU in economic, political and geostrategic terms. On the one hand, recent developments affecting the EU have motivated the Heads of State or Government to rediscover Turkey's relevance as 'key strategic partner'. On the other hand, prospects of Turkey's accession to the EU have reached an all-time low in the light of Turkey distancing itself from the political accession criterion as well as the multiple internal crises the EU has been confronted with. This renders EU-Turkey relations a highly topical issue for academic research.

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edited by

Funda Tekin

Ebru Turhan

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INTRODUCTION

German-Turkish Relations – Intermestic, Interdependent, Intricate

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1. Introduction

In recent years the German-Turkish dialogue has been increasingly becoming subject to German, Turkish and European political, academic, public and media debates. The bilateral relationship has been in fact attracting attention for many decades taking into consideration the multidimensional complex interdependence between both countries and a vicious cycle of ebbs and flows that has dominated German-Turkish relations. The overarching evolution of the bilateral dialogue between Germany and Turkey has been a journey with numerous crossroads as throughout the contemporary history moments of conflict between both countries were followed by an era of rapprochement and intensified interest-oriented collaboration which was yet again succeeded by another period of disagreement and estrangement based on diverging preferences and interests. Whereas various phases of conflict, convergence or standstill could also be observed in the overarching relationship between Turkey and the European Union (EU)¹, the German-Turkish dialogue has experienced sharper, more clear-cut U-turns and transitions.

Sharp and rapid adjustments in the key parameters and scope of the relations between Germany and Turkey has more recently taken place, above all,

- a) *in December 1999*, when the Helsinki European Council granted Turkey candidate country status with the strong support provided by the Gerhard Schröder government² and when the German-Turkish bilateral di-

1 Hauge, Hanna-Lisa/ Eralp, Atila/ Wessels, Wolfgang/ Bedir, Nurdan S. Mapping milestones and periods of past EU-Turkey relations. FEUTURE Working Paper, September 2016.

2 See for instance, Rumford, Chris. From Luxembourg to Helsinki: Turkey, the politics of EU enlargement and prospects for accession. In: Contemporary Politics, 2000, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 331 – 343.

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- alogue took a positive turn in economic and political terms by means of Turkey's enhanced European perspective;
- b) *in early 2013* with Germany's adoption of a more positive attitude towards the acceleration of Turkey's EU accession process, the realization of regular official visits to Turkey by the representatives of German federal and state governments and the launch of the German-Turkish Strategic Dialogue Mechanism taking into account the negative externalities arising from the Eurozone crisis and the Arab Spring³;
 - c) *in early June 2013* following the Gezi Park incidents and Germany's subsequent official criticism of their handling by Ankara accompanied by the German decision to veto the opening of a new negotiation chapter in Turkey's accession talks with the EU⁴;
 - d) *in late 2015*, when a sudden yet temporary rapprochement took place between Germany and Turkey, and when German Chancellor Angela Merkel unanticipatedly supported the revitalization of Turkish accession process in exchange for Ankara's enhanced cooperation with the EU on the management of irregular migration flows⁵ and
 - e) *in mid-2016*, when an extensive period of conflict and magnified estrangement between both countries kicked off as a result of various incidents including the adoption of a resolution by the German *Bundestag* (federal parliament) recognizing the mass death of Armenians in 1915 as a "genocide"; Ankara's consequent ban on German parliamentary delegation's visit to the Incirlik military base that hosted roughly 250 German troops as part of the anti-IS Coalition and Berlin's palpable criticism of post-coup developments in Turkey.⁶

3 Turhan, Ebru. Europe's Crises, Germany's Leadership and Turkey's EU Accession Process, 2016, In: CESifo Forum, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 25-29; Turhan, Ebru. Germany's Leadership Role in the Eurozone Crisis and its Implications for Turkey's EU Bid: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach. Paper presented at the 44th UACES Annual Conference, 1-3 September 2014, Cork.

4 Szabo, Stephen, F. Germany and Turkey: The Unavoidable Partnership. Brookings Institute Report, March 2018; Seufert, Günter. Türkei. In: Werner Weidenfeld/Wolfgang Wessels (Eds.). Jahrbuch der europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden, 2013, p. 136.

5 Aydın, Yaşar/ Turhan, Ebru. Deutschlands Rolle beim Flüchtlingsabkommen mit der Türkei: Eine Zäsur in der deutschen Türkei-Politik?. In: Wolfgang Gieler/ Burak Gümüş/ Yunus Yıldaş (Eds.). Deutsch-Türkische Beziehungen: Historische, sektorale und migrationsspezifische Aspekte. Frankfurt/Main, 2017, pp. 395-414.

6 See for details, Turhan, Ebru. The Struggle for the German-Turkish Partnership: Preventing the 'Train Crash'. In: E-International Relations, 2016, <http://www.e-ir.info/2016/12/04/the-struggle-for-the-german-turkish-partnership-preventing-the-train-crash/> [01.11.2018].

The cyclical trends in German-Turkish relationship appear to continue – with one difference: Lately, phases of conflict have started to last longer and include magnified levels of estrangement and mutual distrust, whereas periods of rapprochement and consistent collaboration free of conflict have been appearing to last shorter. The most recent period of proper rapprochement and intensified intergovernmental collaboration was predominantly interest-driven and took place between September 2015 and May 2016 throughout the efforts to finalize as well as implement the “EU-Turkey Statement”⁷ on dealing with the refugee crisis, which had transformed from a crisis of the Middle East to a European/German one mid-2015. The EU-Turkey Statement, also to be known as the EU-Turkey refugee “deal”, aimed - alongside the management of irregular migration flows - at the intensification and further institutionalization of the relations between the EU and Turkey with the launch of talks in new chapters in Turkey’s accession negotiations with the EU, the acceleration of the visa liberalisation process, the kick-off of talks on the upgrading of the Customs Union (CU) and the carrying out of bilateral summits on a regular basis. Nevertheless, the EU/German-Turkish relationship has since June 2016 been largely in a state of turmoil.

Many developments and incidents contributed to the escalation of bilateral disputes and estrangement between Ankara and Berlin as a result of diverging preferences and interests accompanied by the emergence of negative externalities for one party on account of the strategic policy choices made by the other. The Armenian bill and the subsequent Incirlik decision of the Turkish government; German withdrawal from the base; Germany’s “politics of balance”⁸ with regard to the armed terrorist organization the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and its delivery of military aid to the Kurdish Peshmerga throughout the turmoil in Syria, which then appeared to be delivered to the PKK-annexed Democratic Union Party (PYD)⁹; German television comedian Jan Böhmermann’s crude satirical poem about Turk-

7 European Council. EU-Turkey statement, 18 March 2016, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/> [08.09.2018].

8 Yılmaz, Ömer. Germany’s Kurdish and PKK Policy: Balance and Strategy. In: *In-sight Turkey*, 2016, Vol. 18, No. 1, p. 101.

9 Spiegel Online. Ausrüstung der Bundeswehr möglicherweise in die Hände der PKK gelangt, 14 February 2015, <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/bundeswehr-waffen-moeglicherweise-in-haende-der-pkk-gelangt-a-1018355.html> [08.10.2018]; Spiegel Online. Kurdenmiliz kämpft offenbar mit deutschen Waffen gegen Jesiden, 6 March 2017, <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/irak-kurden-miliz-kaempft-offenbar-mit-deutschen-waffen-gegen-jesiden-a-1137481.html> [08.10.2018].

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ish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan¹⁰; clear diverging views of both governments on political and societal developments in Turkey post-coup attempt¹¹; the leaked 2016 report of the German Ministry of Interior that claimed the “Islamization” of Ankara’s domestic and foreign policies and Turkey’s transition to a central platform for the activities of Middle Eastern terrorist groups¹²; the prohibition of Turkish election rallies in Germany ahead of the April 2017 Turkish constitutional referendum and Ankara’s subsequent comparison of the German ban with “Nazi practices”¹³; the imprisonment of German journalist Deniz Yücel by Turkish authorities who was then released after more than one year of pre-trial detention; other German citizens who remain imprisoned in Turkey, and Germany’s veto on the launch of talks on the update of the CU between Turkey and the EU¹⁴ have been some of the many issues of heightened contention between Germany and Turkey in the last 2,5 years.

2. From an “almost” train crash to a quick full recovery?

The relations between both countries have been recently showing some early signs of normalization. Following a phase of heightened estrangement and conflict that lasted for about two years some steps towards reconciliation have been taken by both countries since late-summer 2018 in consideration of mutual strategic interests and converging preferences in both economic and political terms. Indeed, German-Turkish efforts for rapprochement coincided with several developments including the emergence of a severe economic turmoil in Turkey following the authorization of

10 Smale, Alison. German Comedian Is Told Not to Repeat Lewd Lines About Erdoğan- In: The New York Times, 10 February 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/10/world/europe/jan-bohmermann-recep-tayyip-erdogan-poem.html> [08.10.2018].

11 Turhan. The Struggle for the German-Turkish Partnership: Preventing the ‘Train Crash’.

12 BBC News. Turkey fury over Islamism claims in leaked German report, 17 August 2016, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37109943> [10.10.2018].

13 Zeit Online. Erdoğan wirft Deutschland “Nazi-Praktiken vor”; 5 March 2017, <https://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2017-03/recep-tayyip-erdogan-tuerkei-deutschland-behoerden-nazi-methoden-wahlkampfauftritte> [10.10.2018].

14 Özcan, Celal. Merkel conveys Germany’s veto on Customs Union update with Turkey to Juncker. In: Hürriyet Daily News, 31 August 2017, <http://www.hurriyet-dailynews.com/merkel-conveys-germanys-veto-on-customs-union-update-with-turkey-to-juncker-117422> [10.10.2018].

trade sanctions against Turkey by US President Donald Trump in early August 2018, Berlin's succeeding statement about Germany's strategic interest in the maintenance of an "economically prosperous Turkey"¹⁵, which indicated possible negative externalities of a Turkish economic crisis for the German economy and companies operating in Turkey, increasing frictions in the transatlantic alliance in view of controversy over many issues including the Paris Agreement on climate change and Trump's withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear deal, and the likelihood of a new Syrian refugee wave as a result of increasing violence experienced in the Syrian province of Idlib. These incidents led to the realization of reciprocal official visits by key representatives of German and Turkish governments in the second half of 2018, some of which were accompanied by high-level business delegations.¹⁶

A quick and complete recovery from turmoil however appears to be very unlikely as a result of already done severe damage resulting in mutual distrust between Ankara and Berlin and the ongoing preference divergence with regard to various policy areas. For instance, as far as Turkey's EU accession process and the overarching relationship between Turkey and the EU are concerned, it should be underlined that Germany has emerged as a visible, self-confident and assertive veto player in recent years. For many decades, Germany has in fact been a key actor in the formulation of the dialogue between Turkey and the EU, in general, and the progression of Turkish accession process, in particular. This has been an unavoidable outcome of Germany's overall structural capabilities which "provide the country with a greater leeway for power politics"¹⁷ in the interstate negotiations concerning agenda-shaping and decision-making processes in the two intergovernmental EU institutions most relevant for the making of EU enlargement politics: the European Council and Council of Ministers¹⁸. That being said, until very recently Germany had been tending to shape the EU-

15 Deutsche Welle. Angela Merkel urges Turkey to keep hands off central bank, 13 August 2018, <https://www.dw.com/en/angela-merkel-urges-turkey-to-keep-hands-off-central-bank/a-45069339> [11.10.2018].

16 Turkey visit of German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas (05-06.09.2018); Turkish Minister of Finance Berat Albayrak's Germany visit (21.09.2018); Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's visit to Germany (27-29.09.2018); German Minister for Economic Affairs and Energy Peter Altmaier's visit to Turkey (25-26.10.2018).

17 Turhan. Europe's Crises, Germany's Leadership and Turkey's EU Accession Process.

18 Turhan, Ebru. Turkey's EU accession process: do member states matter?. In: Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 2016, Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 463-477; Tallberg, Jonas. Bargaining Power in the European Council, In: Journal of Common

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Turkish relationship behind closed doors by means of intergovernmental negotiations rather than through unilateral statements in front of micro-phones and cameras.

3. *Changing dynamics of German-Turkish relations*

A combination of different dynamics including the emergence of a fresh narrative in German foreign policy making in 2014 founded on Germany's stepping up to greater responsibilities and pursuing a more active foreign policy both Europe-wide and globally¹⁹, a remarkably Turkey-sceptic German public opinion²⁰ and rising populist / Eurosceptic attitudes in Germany contributed to the appearance of a more assertive German policy making with regard to EU-Turkey dialogue. A more resolute and visible German foreign policy making vis-à-vis EU-Turkey relations has been above all reflected in the German coalition agreement which highlighted Berlin's resistance to the opening of any new chapter in Turkey's accession talks with the EU, while also noting Germany's clear scepticism about the fulfilment of Turkey's visa liberalization process and the launch of negotiations on the updating of the EU-Turkey CU.²¹ For the very first time, the German federal government openly and somehow (vis-à-vis its voter base) bindingly integrated its prospective veto on possible developments with re-

Market Studies, 2008, Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 685–708; Bailer, Stefanie. What Factors Determine Bargaining Power and Success in EU Negotiations?. In: Journal of European Public Policy, 2010, Vol. 17, No. 5, pp. 743–757.

- 19 Steinmeier, Frank-Walter. "Review 2014 – A Fresh Look at German Foreign Policy" - Closing Remarks by Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier. 20.05.2014 – Speech, <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/140520-bm-review2014-abschlussrede/262346> [05.10.2018]; König, Nicole. Germany's role in Libya and Syria: From restraint to responsibility. In: Niklas Helwig (Ed.). Europe's New Political Engine Germany's role in the EU's foreign and security policy. FIIA Report 44, 2016, pp. 93-110; Bendiek, Annegret. The "2014 Review": Understanding the Pillars of German Foreign Policy and the Expectations of the rest of the World. SWP Working Paper, May 2015.
- 20 Otto, Ferdinand/ Venohr, Sascha. Germans Are Becoming More Skeptical of Turkey. In: Zeit Online, 24 August 2017, <https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2017-08/turkey-tourism-holiday-resort-travel-destination> [05.10.2018].
- 21 CDU.de. Ein neuer Aufbruch für Europa Eine neue Dynamik für Deutschland. Ein neuer Zusammenhalt für unser Land. Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD 19. Legislaturperiode, 12 March 2018, pp. 150-15, https://www.cdu.de/system/tdf/media/dokumente/koalitionsvertrag_2018.pdf?file=1 [05.10.2018].

gard to EU-Turkey relations into the coalition agreement which lays down the guiding principles of the government.

Alongside Germany's emergence as a visible and influential veto player in the formation of EU-Turkey dialogue there are various other areas of contention which hinder the progression of German-Turkish relations without a hitch and disruption. Turkey's scope of involvement in the management of the violence and turmoil in Syria has been an issue of dispute between both parties for some time. In a scientific report prepared by the German *Bundestag* and published in December 2018, Turkey's military presence in Northern Syria was described as an "occupying force" and as a violation of the international law.²² German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas had already emphasized in March 2018 that Turkey's permanent stay in Syria was not going to be in accordance with the international law²³ hinting at Germany's discomfort from a strong Turkish presence in Northern Syria. In view of the possibility of the US military's withdrawal from Syria and the prospective shift in the balance of power in the region, German-Turkish preferences are likely to diverge, even more.

Another important point of contention between both countries has been reciprocal discomfort from some judicial processes. While the Turkish government has repeatedly raised its concerns about Germany's processing of asylum applications made by possible members of the Gülenist Terror Organisation (FETÖ), which was responsible for the implementation of the 2016 coup attempt and has been classified as a terrorist organization by Ankara, Berlin has expressed its discomfort from the detention of various German citizens by Turkish authorities on terrorism charges.²⁴ Diverging preferences and tensions between Germany and Turkey also exist in other areas including Turkey's diaspora policies, on the one hand, and

22 Deutsche Welle. Alman meclisi raporu: Türkiye Suriye'de işgalci güç, 26 December 2018, <https://www.dw.com/tr/alman-meclisi-raporu-t%C3%BCrkiye-suriyede-i%C5%9Fgalci-g%C3%BC%C3%A7/a-46866011> [02.01.2019].

23 Zeit Online. Bundestagsgutachten sieht Türkei als Besatzungsmacht, 26 December 2018, <https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2018-12/bundestagsgutachten-besatzungsmacht-tuerkei-syrien> [02.01.2019].

24 See on this for instance, Daily Sabah. Thousands of FETÖ members sought asylum in EU countries in two years, 21 December 2018, <https://www.dailysabah.com/investigations/2018/12/22/thousands-of-feto-members-sought-asylum-in-eu-countries-in-two-years> [02.01.2019]; Reuters. German man sentenced in Turkey on terrorism charges: German foreign ministry, 26 October 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-germany-security/german-man-sentenced-in-turkey-on-terrorism-charges-german-foreign-ministry-idUSKC-N1N01FO> [02.01.2019].

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the “clash of models” between two countries as regards Turkish immigrant community’s integration into Germany, on the other,²⁵ and the situation of rule of law and human rights in Turkey.²⁶ Both countries’ differing preferences and interests in these policy areas accompanied by continuing partial mutual distrust as a result of the use of harsh rhetoric against each other hinder a quick and complete restoration of the intergovernmental dialogue between Berlin and Ankara. This has also been reflected in both parties’ inability to convene already established high-level intergovernmental dialogue instruments such as German-Turkish intergovernmental consultations and the German-Turkish Strategic Dialogue Mechanism.

4. Germany and Turkey: intermestic affairs and conflictual cooperation as a result of complex interdependence

Despite the endurance of various contentious issues in the German-Turkish relationship and the continuing existence of severe differences as regards ideological attitudes and the normative attributions of freedom and security both countries refrain from causing an apparent “train crash” in the bilateral dialogue and tend to maintain cooperative working relationships in manifold policy areas. In this vein, German-Turkish dialogue seems to be above all based on the principle of “conflictual cooperation”, according to which “cooperation in some areas coexist with instances of disagreement and even conflict in others.”²⁷ Accordingly, the bilateral relationship between both countries bears a resemblance to a rollercoaster ride, “with the

25 Öktem, Kerem. Turkey’s Diaspora Policies and Germany’s Turks: No Fifth Column, but Multiple Tensions. In: Ebru Turhan/ Günter Seufert (Eds.). *German Interests and Turkey’s EU Accession Process: a Holistic Perspective*. Istanbul, 2015, p. 21; see also Aydın, Yaşar. Turkey’s New Diaspora Policy: Leverage or Obstacle for Turkey’s EU-Membership Cause?. In: Ebru Turhan/ Günter Seufert (Eds.). *German Interests and Turkey’s EU Accession Process: a Holistic Perspective*. Istanbul, 2015, pp. 22-23.

26 See for example, Die Bundesregierung. Pressekonferenz von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel und dem türkischen Ministerpräsidenten Binali Yıldırım im Bundeskanzleramt, 15 February 2018, <https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/pressekonferenzen/pressekonferenz-von-bundeskanzlerin-merkel-und-dem-tuerkische-n-ministerpraesidenten-binali-y%C4%B1ld%C4%B1r%C4%B1m-849330> [10.11.2018].

27 Ergun, Doruk/ Dessi, Andrea/ Lindgaard, Jakob/ Ala’Aldeen, Dlawer/ Palani, Karaman. The Role of the Middle East in the EU-Turkey Security Relationship: Key Drivers and Future Scenarios. FEUTURE Online Paper No. 20, May 2018, p. 2.

display of dramatic tensions followed by signs of rapprochement in view of common interests and preferences.”²⁸

The conflictual cooperative working relationship between Germany and Turkey is most of all the result of a unique “complex interdependence” between the two countries. While neoliberalism defines interdependence as a situation “characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries”²⁹, it utilizes the concept of “complex interdependence” to define an international system model that would contradict the realist ideal type of international system³⁰ and demonstrate a clear and visible linkage between interdependence and regional integration/cooperation through the presupposition of the existence of multi-dimensional and multi-level interdependence between states, in the highest possible degree. In such an international system, societies are connected by manifold informal and formal ties at interstate, transgovernmental and transnational levels. The absence of hierarchy among different policy areas and issues culminates in the blurring of the distinction between domestic and foreign politics and in the emergence of different levels of interstate cooperation as well as conflict. While security and military power still remain relevant to interstate dialogue in an international system dominated by complex interdependence, issues of low politics such as economy, environment or social affairs increasingly become significant, too.³¹ Under complex interdependence, states’ national sovereignty is profoundly constrained and cooperation among them becomes necessary.

The concept of complex interdependence also features two important characteristics that need to be taken into account throughout its application to various situations of interstate dialogue and collaboration: 1) The concept has been predominantly formulated to study the relations between states that embrace pluralist democratic principles.³² This accompanied by its representation of an extreme end of the spectrum dealing with various modes of international system hinders its applicability to all kinds of relations between states. 2) As a result of the curvilinear relationship be-

28 Turhan. *The Struggle for the German-Turkish Partnership: Preventing the ‘Train Crash’*.

29 Keohane, Robert O./ Nye, Joseph S. *Power and Interdependence*, 2nd Edition. New York / London, 1989, p.2.

30 Keohane, Robert O./ Nye, Joseph S. *Power and Interdependence Revisited*. In: *International Organization*, 1987, Vol. 41, No. 4, p. 731.

31 Keohane, Robert O./ Nye, Joseph S. *Power and Interdependence*, pp. 24-26.

32 Nye, Joseph S. *Power in a Global Information Age: From Realism to Globalization*. London, 2004, p. 197.

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tween interdependence, cooperation and conflict³³, interstate interdependence may bring about both conflict and cooperation depending on its degree and the related policy area.

Despite the limited applicability of the concept of complex interdependence to the bilateral and multilateral dialogues between all states, the overarching evolution of the bilateral dialogue between Germany and Turkey based on the principle of conflictual cooperation features a particularly high degree of interconnectedness, and pushes the relationship as close as possible to the extreme condition of complex interdependence. Indeed, in accordance with the key premises of neoliberalism, German and Turkish societies have been linked for many decades with various formal channels including regular intergovernmental meetings between key representatives of German and Turkish governments, collaboration and exchange of ideas within the context of various international organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Group of Twenty (G20) and Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD), and more recently, with emerging intergovernmental mechanisms including German-Turkish intergovernmental consultations and German-Turkish Energy Forum although the utilization of these dialogue tools have lately been hindered by the escalating diplomatic row between both countries. Informal links between German and Turkish governmental elites have been established for many decades particularly through the realization of bilateral/minilateral meetings, calls and talks outside the framework of official intergovernmental meetings based on personal relationships, particularly, at times of distinct bilateral tensions. The informal talk between former German Foreign Affairs Minister Sigmar Gabriel and Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu in December 2017 in Antalya following severe intergovernmental clashes between both countries³⁴ sets a good example for the employment of informal political channels between Berlin and Ankara.

Similar strong informal ties have also been relevant for the relationship between both countries' governments and multinational German and Turkish companies which play a leading role in the maintenance and enhancement of the bilateral trade and investment partnership, and conse-

33 de Vries, Michiel S. Interdependence, Cooperation and Conflict: An Empirical Analysis. In: *Journal of Peace Research*, 1990, Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 429-444.

34 Deutsche Welle. Germany's Sigmar Gabriel meets Turkey's Mevlut Cavusoglu to discuss 'difficult issues', 4 November 2017, <https://www.dw.com/en/germanys-sigmar-gabriel-meets-turkeys-mevlut-cavusoglu-to-discuss-difficult-issues/a-41235767> [02.01.2019].

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quently, serve as key domestic actors for national preference formation processes. Above all, the presence of more than 7000 companies with German capital in Turkey and their utilization of Turkey as a regional business hub for their operations in the wider neighbourhood point to the triangular relationship between domestic, foreign and regional economic activities. This sphere of transnational economic activities is accompanied by a distinct German-Turkish transnational space resulting from Turkish immigrants and their descendants residing in Germany, who establish extensive channels of communication with Turkey culminating in intensive “border-crossing cultural reproduction, capital accumulation, political engagement, citizenship attainment, hyphenated identities and cultures in fluidity.”³⁵

The complex interconnectedness between German and Turkish societies via multiple formal and informal channels brings along the absence of a clear hierarchy as regards the overarching agenda of German-Turkish dialogue and minimizes the separation between foreign and domestic politics, in accordance with the main assumptions of neoliberalist thought. Indeed, the agenda of German-Turkish dialogue is extremely volatile and based on the absence of a clearly prevailing issue. One day, the governments of the two countries may be occupied with Turkey’s EU accession process and shifts in official German position, while the next day issues such as the activities of PKK members and supporters in Germany, election campaigns of Turkish government representatives and politicians in German cities, bilateral cooperation in the field of energy or the implications of the economic turmoil in Turkey for German companies operating in Turkey and German foreign direct investments (FDI) may dominate the agenda.

These examples also indicate the “intermestic” nature of the German-Turkish relationship³⁶ which triggers the overlapping of internal and external issues and increases the level of complexity in as well as the necessity for policy coordination and cooperation between both countries. As a result of this intermestic feature of German-Turkish bilateral relations, one country’s foreign policy making typically has various domestic politics related consequences for the other party, while domestic developments in one country is frequently leading to a recalibration of foreign policy making vis-à-vis the other country. In a similar vein, in such a relationship, foreign policy making may have domestic drivers and domestic policies may

35 Kaya, Ayhan. Transnational citizenship: German-Turks and liberalizing citizenship regimes. In: *Citizenship Studies*, 2012, Vol. 16, No. 2, p. 154.

36 Szabo. *Germany and Turkey: The Unavoidable Partnership*, p.2.

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frequently be influenced by foreign affairs. That the intermestic character of the bilateral relations between Germany and Turkey has lately become particularly visible is also reflected in the recent establishment of a new department at the German Federal Foreign Office which only deals with the domestic political aspects of German-Turkish relations.

5. Revisiting the German-Turkish affairs: three dimensions

Against this background and taking into account the intermestic and exceptionally interdependent nature of German-Turkish relations, this edited volume revisits the German-Turkish dialogue by focusing on three important aspects of the affairs which particularly involve conflictual cooperative working arrangements between Germany and Turkey:

The European dimension: German-Turkish dialogue on European issues contains manifold aspects which foster the creation of multiple venues for the appearance of conflictual cooperation between both countries due to the existence of sometimes converging, sometimes diverging interests, on the one hand, and the negative externalities that arise for one party as a result of the other's policy preferences, on the other. Issues such as the official position of the German federal government on Turkey's EU accession process and the conflicting personal views of top political figures in German political landscape; the implications of Turkey's partial distancing itself with Europe in manifold aspects, what came to be known as "De-Europeanisation"³⁷, for German-Turkish relations; German-Turkish cooperation in the management of irregular migration flows to Europe and the potential implications of a Turkish withdrawal from the refugee "deal"³⁸ for Germany and Europe undoubtedly relate to the European dimension of German-Turkish relations. As far as the official German attitude towards Turkey's EU accession process is concerned, Mirja Schröder and Funda

37 Aydın-Düzgit, Senem/ Kaliber, Alper. Encounters with Europe in an Era of Domestic and International Turmoil: Is Turkey a De-Europeanising Candidate Country?. In: South European Society and Politics, 2016, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 1-14.

38 A potential withdrawal was indicated many times by top Turkish political figures at times of crisis with Europe/Germany, and particularly throughout the post-coup attempt era. See for instance, Eleftheriou-Smith, Loulla-Mae. Turkey says it will abandon deal stemming flow of refugees if it doesn't get EU visa freedom in October. In: The Independent, 15 August 2016, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/turkey-abandon-deal-stem-flow-refugees-no-eu-visa-freedom-october-a7191921.html> [03.09.2019].

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Tekin point to Germany's increasing visibility in the formation of EU-Turkey dialogue arguing, "If the UK exits the EU, one of the strongest promoters of Turkish accession will have left. With German-Turkish relations in disarray an additional and strong veto player might enter the picture." That Brexit is likely to foster Germany's leadership in the EU and, consequently, in the evolution of Turkey's institutional dialogue with the EU is also emphasized by Thomas Krumm: "After Brexit, a shift of the EU's political centre towards the South is a most likely consequence, giving Germany a more central role in finding and negotiating compromises concerning European policy making between the different regions and member states. [...] Germany's increasing influence in the EU is likely to further decrease Turkey's already rapidly declining chances of entering the EU." While Germany's influence in EU-Turkey dialogue has been gradually growing, the key drivers of this influence, Germany's policy preferences, are determined by various factors. Whereas Ebru Turhan's study highlights "the primacy of Germany's security and welfare related interests over normative considerations as far as the construction of Berlin's policies concerning Turkey's accession to the EU are concerned", it also points to the "increasing importance of non-utilitarian, normative factors" as regards the construction of German-Turkish relations, in general, and German attitude toward Turkish accession process, in particular.

Domestic and foreign politics: The intermestic nature of German-Turkish relations and the complex interdependence between both countries are particularly felt in the makings of domestic and foreign policy by both countries. That foreign policy preferences of one country could typically have significant domestic implications for the other country has been undoubtedly reflected in the German federal parliament's 2016 Armenian resolution and its domestic repercussions within Turkish political, media and public spheres as well as in German companies' concerns about their operations in Turkey following the US launch of trade sanctions against Turkey.³⁹ Likewise, the implications of Germany's/Turkey's domestic policy actions for German-Turkish bilateral relations were for instance felt in Turkey's imprisonment of various German citizens on terrorism charges in the post-coup attempt era and Berlin's consequent strong criticism of Turkey in front of cameras and microphones, which also culminated in

39 Handelsblatt. Wie deutsche Unternehmen unter der Lira-Krise leiden, 13 August 2018, <https://www.handelsblatt.com/finanzen/maerkte/devisen-rohstoffe/folgen-der-tuerkischen-waehrungskrise-wie-deutsche-unternehmen-unter-der-lira-krise-leiden/22909040.html> [20.09.2018].

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various German foreign policy actions such as German veto on the launch of CU reform talks between Turkey and the EU, and in Germany's call to cut the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) provided to Turkey within the context of its EU accession process, which was accepted by the other member states.

As far as the linkage between domestic and foreign policy related factors are concerned, Yaşar Aydın stresses that the existence of Turkey-sceptic public opinion in Germany also serves as an important domestic driver for the maintenance of turmoil in the German-Turkish bilateral dialogue: "According to a survey, 56 percent of the Germans do not approve the refugee deal between Turkey and the EU, and 68 percent of Germans are against a Turkish accession to the EU. The Turkey-sceptic public opinion undoubtedly constraints the policy options of German federal government." In a similar vein, Ebru Turhan studies the gradual domestication of Germany's European policy and notes that the formation of Germany's European policy "has become increasingly domesticated with the progression of the European integration process and, consequently, with competence transfer from the national to the EU level and increased policy coordination at the supranational level." According to Turhan the domestication trend was particularly visible during the crisis eras when key societal actors defined their preferences and interests more precisely, which was also reflected in Germany's foreign policy making towards Turkey throughout the Eurozone and refugee crises. While the blurring of the lines between domestic and foreign politics acts as an important driver in the formulation of German-Turkish relations, Ludwig Schulz points to the substantial differences as regards the use of the concept of "central power" developed by Hans-Peter Schwarz in German and Turkish foreign policy making, which is likely to nurture bilateral disagreements between both countries: "The analysis of the evolution of the concept of 'central power' in the cases of German and Turkish foreign policy demonstrates first and foremost that the concept, although being widely ignored so far, may have implicitly or even explicitly been playing a key role in the making and practice of foreign policy in both countries since the mid-1990s. However, simply put, the notion of 'central power' also is what governments make of it."

Transnational Dynamics: German-Turkish transnational space could be regarded as the most complex, sensitive and volatile dimension of the bilateral dialogue between Germany and Turkey. This dimension is being constantly reshaped by many drivers including Turkey's diaspora politics, Germany's integration policies, the citizenship regimes of both countries, the overarching economic, political and cultural interaction between Germany and Turkey at the intergovernmental level and its impact on the "German-

Turkish community”, this community’s continuously evolving perception of the host and home countries, and the status of anti-immigrant and far-right discourse in Germany. In accordance with the emergence of Turkish foreign policy activism after 2007 “to actively pursue the goal of assuming a leading regional and, ideally, global role”⁴⁰ Ankara lately sought to pursue a more active and institutionalized diaspora policy since it regarded the Turkish diaspora as a “potential source of soft power and influence.”⁴¹ The utilization of Turkish diaspora as a source of power in domestic politics was reflected in the introduction of voting from abroad with the 2014 presidential elections which brought along transnational electoral campaigns in Western Europe and, above all, in Germany. Deniz Kuru notes in his study that Germany’s visible and negative reaction to the making of Turkish electoral campaigns on German soil was the result of the methodological differences between the two countries’ electoral practices: “In comparison to German political parties and political leaders’ small-scale open-air activities, the AKP strategy of organizing huge rallies in sports or entertainment facilities was something so different that this transnationally-run Turkish electoral campaign could not but attract the attention of the German media.”

Elif Posos Devrani turns her attention to the role of the German media in the continuous reproduction of the German-Turkish transnational space focusing particularly on the evolution of the instrumentalization of the German media as a tool for German integration policies. According to Posos Devrani, in the first years following the arrival of Turkish immigrants in Germany “no coverage in media about the Turkish workers and their new lives in Germany existed, which was a consequence of the lack of the attempts to create an integration policy.” However, she also notes that with the adoption of the 2007 German National Integration Plan, German federal government started to effectively utilize various German media outlets as an apparatus for integration, for instance, by calling for co-operation with Turkish-language media, creating awareness about violence against women and recruiting journalists and media professionals of immigrant descent. Another vital factor contributing to the definition of the main parameters and meanings of transnational spaces has been the educational

40 Yorulmazlar, Emirhan/ Turhan, Ebru. Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Arab Spring: Between Western Orientation and Regional Disorder. In: *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 2015, Vol. 17, No. 3, p. 339.

41 Adamson, Fiona B. Sending States and the Making of Intra-Diasporic Politics: Turkey and Its Diaspora(s). In: *International Migration Review*, 2018, DOI: 10.1177/0197918318767665, pp. 15-16.

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opportunities provided to the immigrant communities and the educational credentials the immigrants, and later, their descendants acquire.⁴² Çetin Çelik focuses in this edited volume on socioeconomic and institutional challenges facing second generation Turkish immigrants in Germany on the path to integration and concludes: “Broad ethnic boundaries such as negative public discourses, mono-ethnic citizenship regime, de-industrialization of economy, and rigid school-type tracking are the major realities in the context of reception that second generation Turkish immigrants interact with on daily basis.” Just like educational opportunities, conditions of and limitations to immigrants’ access to housing play an important role in immigrants’ constant reformulation of transnational ties and practices and their perception of the host community. Departing from the recent utilization of neoliberal urban policies in Berlin Defne Kadioğlu Polat shows how “districts that were prior constructed as Turkish or Muslim ghettos, such as Neukölln, have increasingly found their way into tourist guides and are celebrated as exciting hubs to witness the emergence of a new and diverse metropolis” and, consequently, how low-income Turkish immigrants experience negative consequences.

6. The structure of the edited volume

This edited volume consists of three main parts in accordance with the above-mentioned focus on the a priori selected dimensions of the German-Turkish dialogue. In the first part, which deals with the “European dimension” of the affairs, Mirja Schröder and Funda Tekin study the path dependencies in the triangular relationship between Germany, Turkey and the EU applying an institutionalist approach, while Ebru Turhan examines the main drivers of the official German attitude towards Turkey’s EU accession process drawing on the key premises of rationalism and constructivism. Taking the British, German and Turkish approaches to uni-, bi- and multi-lateralism into account, Thomas Krumm elaborates the possible implications of Brexit for the relationship between Germany/the United Kingdom (UK) and Turkey.

In the second part of the edited volume, contributions deal with the role of domestic and foreign politics in the making of German-Turkish re-

42 Faist, Thomas. Transnational social spaces out of international migration: evolution, significance and future prospect. In: *European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie*, 1998, Vol. 38, No. 2, pp. 213-247.

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lations and the linkages between internal and external affairs. Departing from the concept of “central power”, Ludwig Schulz looks at the similarities and differences between German and Turkish foreign policy identities. Ebru Turhan examines the gradual “domestication” of Germany’s European policy and its implications for EU/German-Turkish relations throughout the Eurozone and refugee crises. Yaşar Aydın’s chapter maps both the long-term and short-term conflicts between Germany and Turkey and analyses the domestic, external and structural factors contributing to the emergence and maintenance of diplomatic tensions between both countries.

The third part of the edited volume focuses on German-Turkish transnational space and interactions. Deniz Kuru examines Turkish electoral campaigns in Germany and in wider Western Europe and their perception by the host communities in a comparative perspective. Defne Kadioğlu Polat’s chapter deals with the implications of the gentrification of Berlin’s working class neighbourhoods for Turkish immigrants’ livelihoods, while Çetin Çelik studies the constraining effects of socioeconomic factors and institutional settings on the educational performance of second generation Turkish immigrants. Elif Posos Devrani examines in a chronological order the utilization of the German media as an integration apparatus within the context of the integration policies of successive German governments towards Turkish immigrants.

Following these three main sections, Funda Tekin and Wolfgang Wessels summarize the main findings of this edited volume and provide some projections about the future of the German-Turkish dialogue drawing on various aspects of these findings.