**Fabian Wenner** 

# Liberal Legitimacy

The justification of political power in the work of John Rawls





Nomos

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#### Foreword

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## Table of Contents

Introduction	11
Thinking about legitimacy	11
The liberal perspective on legitimacy	12
The challenge of pluralism and public justification	13
Legitimacy as public justification in Rawls's work	15
The structure of the book	16
Part I - Liberal legitimacy in context	19
1. The concept of legitimacy	19
1.1 The elements of political power	19
1.1.1 The political system	20
1.1.2 The means of the political system	20
1.2 Concepts and conceptions of legitimacy	23
1.3 Empirical conceptions of legitimacy	24
1.3.1 Weber's belief-based conception of legitimacy	25
1.3.2 Beetham's hybrid conception of legitimacy	30
1.4 Normative (especially liberal) conceptions of legitimacy	33
1.4.1 Legitimacy and the resolution of political	
disagreements	35
1.4.2 Legitimacy, the justification of coercion, and obligation	n 39
1.4.3 The standards of legitimacy	44
1.5 Conclusion of the chapter	47
2. Liberal legitimacy and public justification	49
2.1 Two ideas of consent	50
2.2 Voluntarist accounts and their shortcomings	52
2.3 Hypothetical agreement and contractualism	56
2.3.1 The point of contractualist theories	58
2.3.2 The normative role of reasons in contractualist theories	es 61
2.3.3 The example of Kant's contractualism	63
2.4 Legitimacy as public justification	71
2.4.1 From philosophical to public justification	71
2.4.2 The challenge of legitimacy as public justification	74
2.5 Conclusion of the chapter	75

## Table of Contents

6	ırt II:	: Liberal legitimacy in a Rawlsian framework	77
١.	Justi	ice and legitimacy before the political turn	79
	3.1	The nature of justification and reflective equilibrium	80
		, <u>-</u>	83
		3.2.1 The contractualist device of the original position	84
		3.2.2 Two core ideas	86
		3.2.2.1 Society as a system of fair cooperation	87
		3.2.2.2 The two moral powers as the basis of freedom	
		and equality	88
		3.2.3 The original position as a device of representation	91
		3.2.4 The argument from the original position	93
	3.3	Democratic politics and legitimacy in Theory	99
		3.3.1 The application of the principles of justice	100
		3.3.2 Justice, legitimacy, and obligation	103
	3.4	The stability of a well-ordered society as a justificatory	
		condition	105
		3.4.1 Stability for the right reasons	105
		3.4.2 The normative role of stability in Theory	106
		3.4.3 The idea of a well-ordered society	107
		3.4.4 The argument for convergence on justice as fairness	110
	3.5	Conclusion of the chapter	114
ŀ.	The	challenge of reasonable disagreement	115
	4.1	Reasonable disagreement and the burdens of judgment	115
		Reasonable disagreement and the fundamentals of Theory	118
		The problems with reasonable disagreement and pluralism	119
		Conclusion of the chapter	121
		eral legitimacy in <i>Political Liberalism</i>	122
	5.1	The political conception of justice	124
	J.1	5.1.1 The three features of a political conception	125
		5.1.2 The content of public political culture and the process	125
		of justification	129
		5.1.3 Reasonable conceptions of justice and generic	/
		liberalism	133
		5.1.4 Excursus: the philosophical status of PL's argument	135
		5.1.4.1 The role of PL's argument for a liberal	
		conception of justice	137
		5.1.4.2 The normative foundation of PL's argument for	
		a liberal conception of justice	137

	5.2	(Un)Reasonable citizens and the limits of public justification	140
		5.2.1 The epistemic components of reasonableness	141
		5.2.2 The ethical components of reasonableness	143
		5.2.2.1 The idea of reasonable citizens	144
		5.2.2.2 Impermissible conceptions of the good and	
		comprehensive doctrines	147
		5.2.3 Unreasonable citizens and public justification	149
		5.2.4 The rights of unreasonable citizens	152
		5.2.5 Vagueness and the limits of reasonable disagreement	153
	5.3	The role of overlapping consensus	155
		5.3.1 The idea of overlapping consensus	157
		5.3.2 The road to an overlapping consensus	158
		5.3.3 Reasonable comprehensive doctrines and overlapping	
		consensus	162
		5.3.4 Legitimacy and overlapping consensus	168
	5.4	Public reason and the legitimate exercise of political power	172
		5.4.1 The constitutional framework and legitimacy	173
		5.4.2 Public reason as a precondition for the legitimate	
		exercise of political power	175
		5.4.2.1 The idea of public reason	176
		5.4.2.2 Range of application	178
		5.4.3 Neuralgic points of public reason and political	
		liberalism	181
		5.4.3.1 Public reason as a normative notion (not	
		primarily epistemic)	181
		5.4.3.2 Public reason and dependence on	
		comprehensive doctrines	183
		5.4.3.3 The historical contingency of public reason	187
		5.4.3.4 The indeterminacy of public reason	190
		5.4.3.5 Public reason, neutrality, and public	
		justification	191
		5.4.3.6 Political liberalism and unrealistic views of the	
		political	197
	5.5	Conclusion of the chapter	200
6.	Bey	ond legitimacy as public justification	201
	6.1	The duties of citizens who reject political liberalism	201
	6.2	, / <del>-</del>	203
	6.3		204
		Conclusion of the chapter	207

## Table of Contents

Conclusion	208
Bibliography	213