

Lucia M. Sommerer

Self-imposed Algorithmic Thoughtlessness and the Automation of Crime Control

A study of person-based predictive policing and
the algorithmic turn



Nomos

Schriften zur Kriminologie

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Volume 23

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The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at <http://dnb.d-nb.de>

ISBN 978-3-8487-8900-9 (Print)
978-3-7489-2955-0 (ePDF)

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

ISBN 978-3-8487-8900-9 (Print)
978-3-7489-2955-0 (ePDF)

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Sommerer, Lucia
Self-imposed Algorithmic Thoughtlessness and
the Automation of Crime Control
A study of person-based predictive policing and
the algorithmic turn
Lucia Sommerer
260 pp.
Includes bibliographic references.

ISBN 978-3-8487-8900-9 (Print)
978-3-7489-2955-0 (ePDF)



Onlineversion
Nomos eLibrary

1st Edition 2022

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Source: Petrarch, *Remède de l'un et l'autre fortune prospère et négative* (Paris, 1524); Courtesy Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.

Fortuna, the Roman goddess of destiny (left), and the goddess of science Sapientia (right) are depicted in the above image in their traditional opposition. Fortuna's wheel lets human fate rise and fall seemingly by chance, while science promises certainty. The investigation of the 'taming of chance' and thus the specifically modern unification of the arch-rivals Fortuna and Scientia through algorithmic predictions forms the core of this book.¹

1 Illustration from Gigerenzer 1997, xiii, xviii, Gigerenzer 2015, 44 et seq. ('By 'taming chance in Ian Hacking's evocative phrase, probability and statistics had reconciled Scientia to her arch-rival Fortuna.')

Acknowledgements

‘A scholar is just a library’s way of making another library.’
– Daniel Dennett

Scholarly work is never the feat of just a single person. My thanks therefore go to all those who have personally supported me in the past years and enabled me to write this book, but also to those authors whose library of works formed the basis and source of inspiration for this book – in particular, Mireille Hildebrandt, Bernard Harcourt, Tobias Singelstein, Lucia Zedner and Dan McQuillan, who coined the term ‘algorithmic thoughtlessness’.

Special thanks go to my thesis supervisor, Professor Katrin Höffler, for the outstanding support and freedom I was given during my doctoral studies. Always encouraging, she accompanied me along my path, placed a great deal of trust in me and taught me the art of science. She is the best mentor I could have imagined. Her love and passion for criminal law, criminology and sociology of law is truly contagious. I would also like to thank Professor Johannes Kaspar and Professor Jörg-Martin Jehle for their support.

I am further deeply indebted to Eva Marguerite Herzog, Maximiliane Berger, Elena Rittinghausen, Felix Butz and Henrike Kruse, without whose contribution this work would not have been possible.

I am also grateful to Yale Law School, particularly the Information Society Project, which during my LL.M.-studies gave me the opportunity to deepen the international perspective on this topic. I would like to thank Professor Jack Balkin and Professor Tom Tyler for their helpful feedback.

I also want to thank the staff of the Yale Law School Graduate Program, in particular Maria Dino, Allegra Di Buenaventura and Gordon Silverstein, as well as the extraordinary librarians of the Law School, in particular Lucie Olejnikova.

Finally, my thanks go to the Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes for financing my research, especially to Professor Florian Jacoby and Professor Henning Ernst Müller, who placed their trust in me at the very early stages of my research.

The initial ideas for this book became crystallized – far removed from the constraints of everyday life – in the summer of 2017 on the Maltese

Acknowledgements

island of Gozo. I would like to thank the owner of the lonely beach house in the bay of Ghajn Barrani for their hospitality.

This book constitutes an abridged translation of the author's German doctoral thesis. The thesis was awarded 1st place in the Körber Prize and the young scholars' award of the German Foundation for Law and Informatics. The book includes literature and case law up to January 2021.

Table of Contents Overview

| | |
|--|-----|
| Table of Contents | 13 |
| List of Figures | 21 |
| List of Tables | 23 |
| Chapter I. Foundations of person-based predictive policing | 25 |
| A. Introduction | 25 |
| B. Chapter structure | 28 |
| C. Terminology | 29 |
| I. Types of predictive policing | 30 |
| II. Crime algorithms beyond preventive policing: court proceedings, the penitentiary system and <i>ex post</i> police investigations | 34 |
| D. Research design | 34 |
| E. Technological background | 38 |
| I. Traditional statistical methods | 38 |
| II. Algorithmic predictions | 49 |
| F. Examples of predictive policing | 62 |
| I. US and UK | 62 |
| II. Germany | 69 |
| G. Factual limits of person-based predictive policing | 83 |
| I. No overall assessment – big data does not mean all data | 84 |
| II. No causality | 85 |
| III. No neutrality | 87 |
| H. Conclusion on Chapter I. | 96 |
| Chapter II. Legal limits of person-based predictive policing | 97 |
| A. Constitutional framework | 97 |
| I. Privacy | 98 |
| II. Non-discrimination | 109 |

Table of Contents Overview

| | |
|--|-----|
| III. Transparency | 120 |
| IV. Presumption of innocence | 160 |
| B. Summary of Chapter II: Legal limits of person-based predictive policing | 161 |
| Chapter III. The algorithmic turn in crime control – a criminological, sociological and legal theoretical analysis | 163 |
| A. Risk: a definition | 164 |
| I. Ambiguity | 165 |
| II. Negative connotations of risk in the risk society | 165 |
| III. Unequal distribution of risks | 167 |
| IV. Social assignment of meaning | 167 |
| V. Quantification of risks: the lure of numbers | 168 |
| VI. Risk perception | 169 |
| VII. Tolerable risks | 170 |
| VIII. Risk vs. danger | 171 |
| IX. Conclusion on risk | 172 |
| B. Status quo: risk-based crime control | 173 |
| I. Examples of risk-oriented norms | 174 |
| II. Security society | 175 |
| III. The actuarial turn | 177 |
| IV. Summary of status quo | 179 |
| C. Development: algorithmic crime control and the algorithmic turn | 180 |
| I. Continuation of risk-based crime control | 181 |
| II. New challenges associated with the algorithmic turn | 184 |
| D. Conclusion on the algorithmic turn | 211 |
| Chapter IV. Minimum requirements for algorithmic crime prediction | 213 |
| A. Development modalities | 213 |
| I. Transparency | 214 |
| II. Impartiality | 215 |
| B. Deployment modalities | 216 |
| I. Statutory basis | 216 |
| II. Risk communication | 216 |
| C. Control modalities | 217 |

Table of Contents Overview

| | |
|---|-----|
| D. Checklist | 219 |
| Chapter V. Closing remarks: Tyrannicide and a new beginning | 221 |
| Chapter VI. Theses | 223 |
| Bibliography | 225 |

Table of Contents

| | |
|--|----|
| List of Figures | 21 |
| List of Tables | 23 |
| Chapter I. Foundations of person-based predictive policing | 25 |
| A. Introduction | 25 |
| B. Chapter structure | 28 |
| C. Terminology | 29 |
| I. Types of predictive policing | 30 |
| 1. Person-based and location-based | 30 |
| 2. Suspicion confirming and suspicion generating approaches | 32 |
| II. Crime algorithms beyond preventive policing: court proceedings, the penitentiary system and <i>ex post</i> police investigations | 34 |
| D. Research design | 34 |
| 1. Topicality | 34 |
| 2. Transformative potential | 36 |
| 3. Research gap | 37 |
| E. Technological background | 38 |
| I. Traditional statistical methods | 38 |
| 1. Compiling database | 40 |
| 2. Defining target variable | 40 |
| 3. Defining predictive input variables | 41 |
| 4. Deducing a predictive model | 42 |
| 5. Risk translation and risk communication | 43 |
| a) Percentages | 43 |
| b) Probability of crime in comparison to the average population | 43 |
| c) Base rate | 44 |
| d) Error rate | 45 |
| e) Cut-off | 45 |

Table of Contents

| | |
|--|----|
| 6. Application to individual cases | 45 |
| a) People affected by crime prognoses | 46 |
| b) Prognosis tool operators | 47 |
| II. Algorithmic predictions | 49 |
| 1. Rule-based algorithmic predictions | 50 |
| 2. Machine learning algorithmic predictions | 52 |
| a) Differences: Compiling training dataset (step 1) | 53 |
| b) Differences: Defining target variables (step 2) | 54 |
| c) Differences: Defining predictive input variables (step 3) | 54 |
| d) Differences: Deducing a predictive model (step 4) | 56 |
| e) Differences: Risk translation and risk communication (Step 5) | 58 |
| f) Differences: Application to the individual case (step 6) | 58 |
| aa) People affected by crime prognoses | 58 |
| bb) Prognosis tool operators | 59 |
| (1) From prognosis experts to prognosis laypeople | 59 |
| (2) Automation bias | 60 |
| 3. Conclusion: technological background | 61 |
| F. Examples of predictive policing | 62 |
| I. US and UK | 62 |
| 1. Beware | 64 |
| 2. HART (Harm Assessment Risk Tool) | 65 |
| 3. Strategic Subject List | 66 |
| 4. Summary US and UK | 69 |
| II. Germany | 69 |
| 1. RADAR-iTE (Rule-based analysis of potentially destructive perpetrators to assess acute risk – Islamist terrorism) | 71 |
| a) Prognosis tool development | 71 |
| b) Prognosis tool application | 72 |
| aa) Prognosis tool operators | 73 |
| bb) People affected by crime prognoses | 74 |
| cc) Lack of transparency | 74 |
| 2. Palantir Gotham – hessenDATA | 75 |
| 3. DyRiAS (Dynamic Risk Analysis System) | 76 |
| a) Prognosis tool development | 77 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| b) Prognosis tool application | 78 |
| aa) Prognosis tool operators | 79 |
| bb) People affected by crime prognoses | 79 |
| 4. Flight Data Pattern Recognition | 80 |
| 5. Summary Germany | 82 |
| G. Factual limits of person-based predictive policing | 83 |
| I. No overall assessment – big data does not mean all data | 84 |
| II. No causality | 85 |
| III. No neutrality | 87 |
| 1. Data selection | 88 |
| a) Lack of data quality | 88 |
| b) The dark figure of crime | 89 |
| c) Lack of training data representativity | 91 |
| d) Perpetuation of societal discrimination | 91 |
| e) Conclusion on data selection and possible solutions | 92 |
| 2. Definition of target variables | 93 |
| 3. Selection of input variables | 94 |
| 4. Calibration and monitoring of the learning process | 94 |
| a) Error rate | 94 |
| b) Overfitting and spurious correlations | 95 |
| 5. Summary of no neutrality | 96 |
| H. Conclusion on Chapter I. | 96 |
| Chapter II. Legal limits of person-based predictive policing | 97 |
| A. Constitutional framework | 97 |
| I. Privacy | 98 |
| 1. Scope | 98 |
| a) Autonomous decisions about the disclosure and use of personal data | 99 |
| b) Protected data | 99 |
| c) Prohibition of personality profiling | 100 |
| d) Public interest dimension and chilling effects | 100 |
| 2. Limits and proportionality | 101 |
| 3. Specific limits placed on person-based predictive policing by the right to privacy | 103 |
| a) Presence of high-intensity infringements | 103 |
| aa) Secrecy and lack of transparency | 104 |
| bb) Scope | 104 |
| cc) Automation | 105 |

Table of Contents

| | |
|---|-----|
| dd) Proximity to personality profiles | 105 |
| ee) Stigmatization | 106 |
| b) Consequences of a high infringement intensity | 106 |
| aa) Sufficiently serious offences | 107 |
| bb) Concretely foreseeable danger | 107 |
| (1) Requirements of the BVerfG for dragnet investigations | 107 |
| (2) No lowering of the intervention threshold below a concrete danger | 108 |
| c) Organizational and procedural safeguards | 108 |
| 4. Summary of privacy | 109 |
| II. Non-discrimination | 109 |
| 1. Introduction | 110 |
| 2. Sources of algorithmic discrimination | 113 |
| a) Compiling the training database | 113 |
| b) Defining target variables | 113 |
| c) Defining predictive input variables | 114 |
| d) Calibration and monitoring of the learning process | 114 |
| 3. Constitutional law view on algorithmic discrimination | 115 |
| a) Detection of unequal treatment | 117 |
| b) Statistical justifications | 117 |
| aa) Argument of ‘rational racism’ | 118 |
| bb) Argument of ‘lesser evil’ | 119 |
| 4. Conclusion on non-discrimination | 120 |
| III. Transparency | 120 |
| 1. Janus-headedness of the black box terminology | 121 |
| 2. Three layers of non-transparency | 124 |
| a) Terminology | 124 |
| aa) Intentional lack of transparency | 125 |
| bb) Illiterate lack of transparency | 126 |
| cc) Intrinsic lack of transparency | 127 |
| (1) Machine learning algorithms | 127 |
| (2) Rule-based algorithms | 128 |
| (3) Examples | 128 |
| (4) Attempt at a solution: Explainable AI | 129 |
| b) Conclusion on transparency layers | 130 |
| 3. Transparency fostering mechanisms | 131 |
| a) First dimension of transparency: moment of transparency | 132 |

| | | |
|-----|--|-----|
| b) | Second transparency dimension: transparency-entitled entity | 133 |
| aa) | Affected citizens | 133 |
| | (1) Single individuals | 133 |
| | (2) Collaborative crowdsourcing | 134 |
| bb) | Government control body | 135 |
| | (1) Possible configurations | 135 |
| | (2) Personnel resources | 136 |
| | (3) Organizational-structural considerations | 136 |
| | (4) Conclusion on a government control body | 137 |
| cc) | General public | 137 |
| dd) | Summary of the people authorized to access information | 138 |
| c) | Third dimension of transparency: scope of transparency | 139 |
| aa) | Abstract information | 139 |
| | (1) Existence and use | 139 |
| | (2) General principles of action | 140 |
| | (3) Source code | 140 |
| | (4) Output testing | 140 |
| | (5) Logging obligations in the design phase | 141 |
| bb) | Explanation in individual cases | 142 |
| cc) | Conclusion on transparency mechanisms | 143 |
| 4. | Arguments against transparency | 144 |
| a) | Impossibility of transparency | 145 |
| b) | Unnecessity of transparency | 146 |
| aa) | Human in the loop | 146 |
| bb) | Comparison with existing non-transparencies | 147 |
| c) | Preponderance of competing interests | 149 |
| aa) | Trade secrets | 149 |
| bb) | Spying on the algorithm | 151 |
| cc) | Third-party data protection | 152 |
| dd) | Summary: Preponderance of competing interests | 152 |
| d) | Conclusion on arguments against transparency | 153 |
| 5. | The foundations of transparency in constitutional law | 153 |
| a) | Human dignity as the core of the right to informational self-determination | 153 |
| b) | Democracy principle | 155 |
| aa) | Chain of democratic legitimation | 155 |
| bb) | Democratic formation of opinion | 155 |

Table of Contents

| | |
|--|-----|
| cc) Democratic control | 156 |
| c) Rule of law | 157 |
| 6. Summary of transparency requirements | 158 |
| IV. Presumption of innocence | 160 |
| B. Summary of Chapter II: Legal limits of person-based predictive policing | 161 |
| Chapter III. The algorithmic turn in crime control – a criminological, sociological and legal theoretical analysis | 163 |
| A. Risk: a definition | 164 |
| I. Ambiguity | 165 |
| II. Negative connotations of risk in the risk society | 165 |
| III. Unequal distribution of risks | 167 |
| IV. Social assignment of meaning | 167 |
| V. Quantification of risks: the lure of numbers | 168 |
| VI. Risk perception | 169 |
| VII. Tolerable risks | 170 |
| VIII. Risk vs. danger | 171 |
| IX. Conclusion on risk | 172 |
| B. Status quo: risk-based crime control | 173 |
| I. Examples of risk-oriented norms | 174 |
| II. Security society | 175 |
| III. The actuarial turn | 177 |
| IV. Summary of status quo | 179 |
| C. Development: algorithmic crime control and the algorithmic turn | 180 |
| I. Continuation of risk-based crime control | 181 |
| 1. Focus on risk well in advance of actual harm | 181 |
| 2. Individualized risk ascription on the basis of group characteristics | 181 |
| 3. Enemy perspective | 182 |
| 4. Disguising political value judgements | 182 |
| 5. Summary of risk-based crime control | 184 |
| II. New challenges associated with the algorithmic turn | 184 |
| 1. Loss of legitimacy due to lack of procedural justice | 184 |
| a) Legitimacy and legal compliance | 185 |
| b) Basic concept of procedural justice | 185 |

Table of Contents

| | | |
|---|---|-----|
| c) | Procedural justice in algorithmic decision-making | 187 |
| aa) | Participation | 187 |
| bb) | Neutrality | 188 |
| cc) | Respectful treatment | 189 |
| dd) | Trust in the motives | 190 |
| d) | Transparency as a response to a lack of procedural justice | 191 |
| e) | Summary on legitimacy and procedural justice | 193 |
| 2. | Crime control without criminology | 193 |
| a) | Algorithmic criminology | 197 |
| b) | Summary of crime control without criminology | 197 |
| 3. | Self-imposed algorithmic thoughtlessness | 198 |
| a) | The social psychology perspective on ‘thoughtlessness’ | 199 |
| b) | Moral disengagement algorithmic decision support systems | 200 |
| aa) | Dehumanization – the ‘moral buffer’ | 200 |
| bb) | Displacement of responsibility – from tool to authority figure | 201 |
| cc) | Conclusion on moral disengagement | 203 |
| c) | Self-imposed nonage – willingly entering into a situation of ‘not being able to understand’ | 203 |
| aa) | Deskilling | 204 |
| bb) | Non-transparent algorithms | 204 |
| cc) | ‘Supra-human’ knowledge mediation | 205 |
| d) | Conclusion on self-imposed algorithmic thoughtlessness | 206 |
| 4. | From the logic of the law to the logic of algorithms – ‘machine logic’ | 207 |
| D. | Conclusion on the algorithmic turn | 211 |
| Chapter IV. Minimum requirements for algorithmic crime prediction | | 213 |
| A. | Development modalities | 213 |
| I. | Transparency | 214 |
| II. | Impartiality | 215 |
| B. | Deployment modalities | 216 |
| I. | Statutory basis | 216 |
| II. | Risk communication | 216 |

Table of Contents

| | |
|---|-----|
| C. Control modalities | 217 |
| D. Checklist | 219 |
| Chapter V. Closing remarks: Tyrannicide and a new beginning | 221 |
| Chapter VI. Theses | 223 |
| Bibliography | 225 |

List of Figures

| | |
|--|-----|
| Fig. 1. Overview of predictive algorithms in crime control | 29 |
| Fig. 2. Impact breadth of different predictive policing approaches from ‘suspicion confirming’ to ‘suspicion generating’ | 32 |
| Fig. 3. Three layers of algorithmic non-transparency | 125 |
| Fig. 4. Three dimensions of transparency | 131 |
| Fig. 5. Triangle of algorithmic transparency for person-based predictive policing | 159 |
| Fig. 6. Triangle of algorithmic transparency for person-based predictive policing | 218 |

List of Tables

| | |
|---|-----|
| Tbl. 1. Comparison of traditional statistical and algorithmic crime predictions | 49 |
| Tbl. 2. Overview of selected algorithmic crime prognosis projects in the US and UK | 63 |
| Tbl. 3. Overview of algorithmic crime prediction systems and their precursors in Germany | 70 |
| Tbl. 4. Moment of transparency | 132 |
| Tbl. 5. Transparency-entitled entity | 133 |
| Tbl. 6. Scope of transparency | 139 |
| Tbl. 7. Overview of transparency mechanisms in relation to the three dimensions of transparency | 144 |

