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Noby Thomas Cyriac

Big Data and the Abuse of Dominance by Multi-Sided Platforms

An Analysis of Art. 102 TFEU



Nomos

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TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation	Expansion
AAC	Average Avoidable Cost
AEC	As-Efficient-Competitor
AI	Artificial Intelligence
Art.	Article
ATC	Average Total Cost
AVC	Average Variable Cost
CMA	Competition and Markets Authority
CPU	Central Processing Unit
CRM	Customer Relation Management
EC	European Commission
ECJ	European Court of Justice
edn.	Edition
eds.	Editors
e.g.	exempli gratia
et. al	and others
EU	European Union
Fig	Figure
FTC	Federal Trade Commission
GAFA	Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple
GC	General Court
HMT	Hypothetical Monopolist Test
i.e.	<i>id est</i>
IOT	Internet of Things
Inc.	Incorporated
LRAIC	Long-run Average Incremental Cost
Ltd.	Limited
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
No.	Number
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Ors.	Others
R&D	Research and Development
Sec	Section
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
UK	United Kingdom
URL	Uniform Resource Locator
US	United States
v.	versus

