

Uwe Backes

# Autocracies

Introduction



**Nomos**  
Textbook

Uwe Backes

# Autocracies

Introduction



**Nomos**  
Textbook

This English edition is based on the book „Autokratien“, Nomos 2022, ISBN 978-3-8487-8003-7. Parts of the translation into English were created with support of machine translation and/or artificial intelligence.

**The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek** lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at <http://dnb.d-nb.de>

ISBN 978-3-7560-0637-3 (Print)  
978-3-7489-4267-2 (ePDF)

**British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data**

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

ISBN 978-3-7560-0637-3 (Print)  
978-3-7489-4267-2 (ePDF)

**Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data**

Backes, Uwe

Autocracies

Introduction

Uwe Backes

196 pp.

Includes bibliographic references and index.

ISBN 978-3-7560-0637-3 (Print)  
978-3-7489-4267-2 (ePDF)



Online Version  
Nomos eLibrary

1st Edition 2024

© Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, Germany 2024. Overall responsibility for manufacturing (printing and production) lies with Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG.

This work is subject to copyright. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Under § 54 of the German Copyright Law where copies are made for other than private use a fee is payable to “Verwertungsgesellschaft Wort”, Munich.

No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Nomos or the author.

## Table of Contents

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| <b>List of Figures</b>                               | 7   |
| <b>List of Tables</b>                                | 8   |
| <b>I. Introduction</b>                               | 9   |
| <b>II. Concepts, methods, data</b>                   | 13  |
| 1. Concepts and theories                             | 13  |
| 2. Methods   | 18  |
| 3. Data  | 23  |
| <b>III. Autocracies in the theory of state forms</b> | 35  |
| <b>IV. Analytical categories and typology</b>        | 41  |
| 1. Analytical categories                             | 41  |
| 2. Typology  | 43  |
| <b>V. Despotism</b>                                  | 49  |
| 1. Historical-terminological classification          | 49  |
| 2. Legitimation of rule                              | 53  |
| 3. Structures of rule                                | 55  |
| <b>VI. Absolutism</b>                                | 61  |
| 1. Historical-terminological classification          | 61  |
| 2. Legitimation of rule                              | 64  |
| 3. Structures of rule                                | 67  |
| <b>VII. Authoritarianism</b>                         | 69  |
| 1. Historical-terminological classification          | 69  |
| 2. Legitimation of rule                              | 71  |
| 3. Structures of rule                                | 75  |
| <b>VIII. Ideocracy</b>                               | 85  |
| 1. Historical-terminological classification          | 85  |
| 2. Legitimation of rule                              | 88  |
| 3. Structures of Rule                                | 94  |
| <b>IX. System stability</b>                          | 103 |
| 1. Conceptual basics                                 | 103 |
| 2. Legitimation of rule                              | 106 |
| 3. Structures of rule                                | 113 |
| <b>X. System transformation</b>                      | 121 |
| 1. Conceptual basics                                 | 121 |
| 2. Forms of Transformation                           | 124 |
| 2.1 De-democratization                               | 124 |

**Table of Contents**

---

|            |  |            |
|------------|--|------------|
| 2.2        | Despotization  | 126        |
| 2.3        | De-totalitarianization and re-totalitarianization              | 128        |
| 2.4        | Hybridization  | 132        |
| 2.5        | Transitory authoritarianism and liberalization                 | 133        |
| <b>XI.</b> | <b>Conclusion and Outlook: Autocracies in the 21st century</b> | <b>143</b> |
|            | <b>Bibliography</b>  | <b>149</b> |
|            | <b>Index of Subjects</b>                                       | <b>183</b> |
|            | <b>Index of Names</b>  | <b>188</b> |

## List of Figures

|               |   |     |
|---------------|---|-----|
| Figure I.1:   | Free, unfree, partially free countries, 2020                    | 9   |
| Figure II.2:  | Actor segments of selectorate theory                            | 17  |
| Figure III.3: | Typology of autocratic regimes according to Juan J. Linz        | 39  |
| Figure IV.4:  | Continuum of autocracies according to legitimization of rule    | 46  |
| Figure V.5:   | Patronage networks  | 52  |
| Figure IX.6:  | Stability conditions  | 104 |
| Figure X.7:   | Phases of system change   | 123 |
| Figure X.8:   | Hybrid regimes  | 133 |
| Figure XI.9:  | Population in free, unfree, partially free countries, 1973-2020 | 143 |

## List of Tables

|                |  |     |
|----------------|--|-----|
| Table II.1:    | Levels of comparison   | 20  |
| Table II.2:    | Number of cases and methods (examples)   | 21  |
| Table II.3:    | Databases and indices  | 26  |
| Table III.4:   | Forms of government according to Aristotle                                     | 35  |
| Table III.5:   | Forms of government according to Montesquieu                                   | 37  |
| Table III.6:   | Forms of government according to Bluntschli                                    | 38  |
| Table IV.7:    | Category scheme for analyzing autocratic rule                                  | 42  |
| Table IV.8:    | Criteria for distinguishing between constitutional governments and autocracies | 45  |
| Table V.9:     | Patrimonial and bureaucratic rule according to Max Weber                       | 50  |
| Table V.10:    | Concepts of personal rule: sultanism and neopatrimonialism                     | 51  |
| Table VI.11:   | Surviving and overthrown monarchies in the Near and Middle East                | 63  |
| Table VII.12:  | Electoral competitiveness and the role of the military (examples)              | 77  |
| Table VII.13:  | Determinants of the degree of competition in limited multiparty systems        | 80  |
| Table VIII.14: | Characteristics of the legitimation of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes  | 90  |
| Table IX.15:   | Value attitudes in selected autocracies compared with Germany                  | 108 |
| Table IX.16:   | Sources of legitimacy of the types of autocracy                                | 110 |
| Table IX.17:   | Opposition and resistance in autocracies                                       | 117 |

## I. Introduction

Every year, the Washington-based nongovernmental organization Freedom House publishes a World Map of Freedom, which ranks all the countries in the world according to the degree to which freedom rights apply (Fig. 1). Its simplifying three-way division of countries into zones of "free", "partly free", and "unfree" states facilitates an overview and vividly illustrates the enormous area of those countries in which people face barely controlled state power and in which active civil rights (such as freedom of expression, association, and assembly) are subject to major restrictions. Political scientists usually define these states as "autocracies" or (often synonymously) "dictatorships".



Figure I.1: Free, unfree, partially free countries, 2020, Source: Own representation. Data adapted from Freedom House, *Map of Freedom 2021*, at: <https://freedomhouse.org/explore-the-map?type=fiw&year=2021> (Jan. 26, 2022). Explanation: white: free, dark gray: unfree, light gray: partially free countries.

According to the Freedom House annual reports, 36 percent of the world's population lived in "unfree" states at the beginning of 2020 (population figures according to: World Bank 2022), led by the People's Republic of China with around 1.4 billion inhabitants, followed by Russia (approx. 144 million), Egypt (about 102 million), the Democratic Republic of Congo (about 89 million), Ethiopia (about 114 million), Vietnam (about 97 million), Iran (about 83 million), Turkey (about 84 million), and numerous less populous countries. "Partially free" states accounted for about a quarter of the world's population, with Indonesia (about 273 million inhabitants) ranked first, followed by Pakistan (about 220 million), Nigeria (about 206 million), Bangladesh (about 164 million), Mexico



## I. Introduction

---

(about 128 million), the Philippines (about 109 million), Thailand (about 69 million), and other smaller countries.

Since Freedom House (Reports 2003, 2015, 2021) has published regular reports since the early 1970s, rough patterns of progression can be discerned. For example, the share of the world's population living in "unfree" states (47.3% in 1972) declined primarily because of the demise of the Soviet Union and its satellites in the early 1990s (31.1% in 1992) but rose again in the following two decades. For the same reason, the share of the world's population living in "partly free states" reached a particularly high level in 1992 (44.1%) and decreased again in the following decades. In 2002, the proportion of the world's population living in "free" states reached a peak, only to decline somewhat thereafter. At the beginning of 2020, only slightly fewer people lived in "unfree" and "partly free" countries (total: 61%) than in 1972 (total: 64.9%).

Francis Fukuyama's (1992) prophecy of the "end of history" as a consequence of a worldwide triumph of the model of free-market democracies needs to be placed under a big question mark in view of the data from Freedom House (and many other findings). In parts of the world, the "China model" (Bell 2015) of autocratic modernization (with undeniable successes in poverty reduction, for example) has gained traction instead. In the U.S. and large parts of Europe, forms of populism with partly extremist features have gained ground, also because of temporarily worsening crisis-ridden developments (euro financial crisis, "refugee crisis", coronavirus pandemic). The question "How Democracies Die" (Levitsky/Ziblatt 2018) influenced the international community of democracy researchers, who developed pessimistic scenarios relating to the slide of the world's most influential democratic constitutional state into authoritarian forms during Donald Trump's presidency. The old theme of democracy safeguards had already experienced a renaissance in the years before. Old emergency safeguards (such as "militant democracy") were rediscovered and discussed again (see only Capoccia 2005, Downs 2012, Kirshner 2014, Thiel 2009).

Against this background, autocracy research has experienced a new upswing. Its subject is as old as mankind and already at the center of the earliest political science studies we know. This textbook aims to link the approaches of the classics with the methods and results of recent and latest autocracy research. It is aimed primarily at students of political science who are looking for a historically embedded introduction to the conditions under which contemporary non-democratic regimes emerge, function, and develop. It follows its own research grid but strives to integrate the perspectives and findings of different schools. It aims to encourage an interdisciplinary view and to integrate approaches and findings from neighboring disciplines (especially history, law, and sociology, but also economics, communication studies, and psychology).

The global view forces us to concentrate on the results of comparative studies with medium and high case numbers. To reduce the unavoidable level of abstraction, generalizing statements are combined with individual case findings wherever

possible in order that overly strong consideration of the dictatorships in Germany can be avoided.

The structure of the book follows a typology, which chapter IV – after introductory sections on the concepts, methods and data of autocracy research and a brief historical outline on the theory of forms of the state – unfolds based on the legitimation of rule, combined with a discussion of the fundamental analytical categories. As a result, separate chapters are devoted to "despotism", "absolutism", "authoritarianism" and "ideocracy". The following two chapters, which deal with conditions of systemic stability and forms of systemic transformation, contain considerations across types. Democratization is focused on less than the transition to autocracy and the change between different types of autocracy. The presentation concludes with a discussion of the causes of the recent "autocratization wave", which is at the center of the international research debate.

This book emerged from my lecture "Autocracies in Comparison" at the Institute of Political Science at the Dresden University of Technology. It owes valuable stimuli to the methodical and methodological expertise of Werner J. Patzelt's comparative systems research of many years, but also, to no small extent, to the critical queries of my students. The same applies to the student assistants who have supported me over many years – often far beyond what could have been expected.

The focus of the lecture changed over the years. To begin with, it focused on totalitarianism research and constructive critical engagement with it. Above all, I owe much to the many years of trusting and friendly cooperation and intellectual exchange with Eckhard Jesse (first: Backes/Jesse 1984). Later, transformation research was added – with new perspectives and insights made possible by a Marie Curie project (with Tytus Jaskułowski and Abel Polese as intellectually stimulating cooperation partners) funded by the European Commission and initiated by Gerhard Besier (Backes/Jaskułowski/Polese 2009). The Hannah Arendt Institute, with its historical research focus on dictatorships in Germany, encouraged interdisciplinary exchange and counteracted the fixation on the present that is often found in political science. At the same time, it broadened the view of the entire spectrum of forms of modern autocracies worldwide. Steffen Kailitz made accessible the results of international autocracy research like no one else at the Institute. The studies of Juan J. Linz, with whom we were able to exchange ideas during an extended stay in Germany in the early 2000s, remained groundbreaking. This sharpened our awareness of the special position of ideological dictatorships, which had lost importance worldwide with Samuel Huntington's third wave of democratization but had by no means disappeared completely from the scene. From this insight sprang – in collaboration with Peter Bernholz, Wolfgang Bialas, Lothar Fritze, Johannes Gerschewski, Christian Göbel, Udo Grashoff, Roger Griffin, Hermann Lübke, Leonid Luks, Jerzy Maćków, Lorenzo Santoro, Manfred G. Schmidt, Peter Thiery, Jiwon Yoon – a volume that sought to elaborate the special features of ideocratic autocracies in comparison with other forms (Backes/Kailitz 2016). Chapter VIII (Ideocracy) builds on this. Some insights from a comparison of forms of "state socialism" have also been incorporated into that chapter (Back-

## I. Introduction

---

es/Heydemann/Vollnhals 2019). Peter Graf Kielmansegg's studies on the theory of legitimacy and the structure of rule (see only the contributions in Cavuldak 2019) provided important impetus in this respect.

The basic typology of this book draws primarily from the profound studies of Juan J. Linz, but at the same time takes up ideas that were drafted in the context of several conceptual historical studies at the Hannah Arendt Institute (most recently: Backes/Heydemann 2018). Mike Schmeitzner was a frequent, always inspiring interlocutor in this process. Later, Thomas Lindenberger joined with new social and everyday historical questions. A historical preliminary appeared in a conceptual historical volume under the aegis of Alexander Gallus and Eckhard Jesse (Backes 2004). A first typological draft was presented for discussion at the conference organized by the "Comparative Political Science" section of the German Political Science Association (DVPW) in Delmenhorst (November 2007). In particular, Gero Erdmann, who died much too early, as well as Marianne Kneuer gave me valuable advice. The linkage of the typological concept with the question of autocratic legitimizing strategies (Backes 2013) and the politics of history (2009 a) was obvious.

Thus, this book has a long history and many spiritual mothers and fathers. The errors and mistakes contained in it are, of course, the sole responsibility of the author.

## IV. Analytical categories and typology

### Summary:

The results of a doctrine of forms of government conducted since antiquity serve as a basis and systematization of elementary categories for the analysis of forms of rule. The specifics of the legitimation of rule form the key to a key for a systematic differentiation of autocracy types. The typological differentiation into despotism, absolutism, authoritarianism, and ideocracy determines the structure and argumentation of the following chapters. Conceptualizations and terminologies based on the structure of rule are included.

### 1. Analytical categories

The history of the theory of state forms, which was traversed in giant steps in the last chapter, provides a variety of analytical categories through which to fathom the variable structural forms of autocratic rule and to understand the statics and functioning of its supporting elements. Aristotle's typology of six, which has been most effective over the centuries and has been applied in ever new configurations, connects two spheres that are closely interwoven: the structure (the construction or architecture) of rule on the one hand, and the mind (the ideas, motives, values, orientation patterns, convictions, and goals) of the rulers on the other. All typologies up to the present refer to one of these spheres and/or link them together. No typology can or wants to cover all spheres equally. However, typologies on different levels can be combined, and the categories of analysis that are effective in them can be used to unravel complex structures of effects and make them understandable.

The intellectual sphere of domination can be described by the generic term *legitimation of rule* (see with different systematization: Brunner 1979; Merkel 2010: 22). It comprises *legitimization of rule* (of the rulers) and *legitimacy of rule* (of the ruled). Legitimization of rule means the narratives, discourses, arguments, procedures, means, and methods that rulers use to justify their exclusive position of power and their actions. Their *claim to power*, expressed in public pronouncements, is frequently incorporated into constitutional documents and shapes more or less elaborate state doctrines in which the *goals of rule* are defined. They determine the central content of state propaganda (in the state media) and indoctrination (especially in the programs of official youth organizations as well as curricula and textbooks).

Legitimacy of rule means the recognition of rule in the eyes of those subject to it. According to Max Weber, this belief in legitimacy can be based on traditional, rational and procedural, or charismatic sources (Weber 2005, pp. 726–742). This refers to the mentalities, ideas, procedures, and personal qualities that determine the success of the legitimization efforts of the rulers. The general population's assessment of the authority's worthiness of recognition essentially determines its willingness to behave in a compliant manner that conforms to the rules and the system and even to support the system actively and loyally (Easton 1965: 289–

#### IV. Analytical categories and typology

310), and thus represents one of the most important determinants of political stability (see Chapter IX). Legitimation of rule thus encompasses the complex interrelationships between legitimization efforts from above and expectations, claims, and convictions for legitimation from below. It generates the binding force without which the halls of power would inevitably collapse at the first major storm.

Table IV.7: Category scheme for analyzing autocratic rule, source: own representation.

| Legitimation of rule         | Structure of rule |
|------------------------------|-------------------|
| Legitimization of rule       | Access to power   |
| ■ Claim to power             | Rulers            |
| ■ Goals of rule              | Exercise of rule  |
| ■ Propaganda, indoctrination | Range of rule     |
| Legitimacy of rule           | Intensity of rule |
| ■ Legitimacy belief          |                   |
| ■ Loyalty                    |                   |

The legitimation of power provides the mortar, as it were, that ensures the stability of the power structure. However, the statics of the *structures of rule* are determined by other factors as well. Of central importance is the arrangement of formal and informal institutions of autocratic rule: How is *access to power* regulated, i.e., how do people gain access to key positions of power? What procedures ensure the (re)appointment (co-optation in the narrower sense; Loewenstein 1973) of vacant top positions? What qualities determine the recruitment for office? Which *ruling bodies* (such as patronage networks, interest groups, parties, the military, militias, security services) have a determining influence on the way in which power is exercised?

The *exercise of rule* is essentially shaped by the type of access to power and the people who hold it. Its success, in turn, depends on the extent to which it succeeds in integrating population groups whose lack of loyalty to the system (disloyalty/semi-loyalty) could pose a threat to the existence of the political system. The better social integration succeeds, the less the autocratic elite will be inclined to use repressive means (creation of fear and terror, threat of violence, use of force, incarceration, imprisonment, political murder). However, the functional logic of autocracies also follows their goals of rule. The more ambitious these goals are, the greater the effort will be to win over as much of society as possible. The claim to power and the goals of power thus explain the different scope and intensity of power to a large extent. The *range of rule* refers to the radius of state intervention and regulation, i.e., the range of social subsystems covered (the economy, religion, culture, sports, leisure). *Intensity of rule*, on the other hand, refers to the density of regulatory intervention by the rulers in certain segments of society. In this

context, the structure of the public sphere, especially the communicative relations between rulers and the ruled (Finer 2003), and the degree of social, economic, and cultural autonomy are of great importance.

## 2. Typology

With the help of the categories of rule described above, a variety of typologies can be formed, which divide an immense wealth of forms into manageable units. Typologies are instruments in the process of cognition. They emphasize certain characteristics while others fade into the background. They are intellectual constructions whose value is measured above all by their ability to facilitate the solution of complex research questions.

This book is based on the distinction between autocracies and constitutional states. It follows Karl Loewenstein, one of the pioneers of modern autocracy research, whose "kratological" (from the Greek *kratein*, meaning to rule) constitutional theory is based on it. In line with Montesquieu (though differing terminologically), autocracies are considered regimes in which a single person or assembly, committee, military junta, or party exercises power without effective control. "The political monopoly of the sole holder of power is not subject to constitutional limitations; his power is absolute" (Loewenstein 2000: 28). Autocracies as systems of concentrated exercising of power are contrasted with constitutional states based "on the principle of power sharing". "Power sharing occurs when several independent power holders or state organs are involved in exercising political power and in the formation of the will of the state. The functions assigned to them are subject to reciprocal control by the other holders of power" (Loewenstein 2000: 27). The central idea of the constitutional state is to secure freedom through power control. It determines its functional logic. Constitutional decision-making processes require the cooperation of various power holders with distributed competencies. Autocracies, on the other hand, follow the logic of concentrated power, which enables the ruling elite to make and enforce its decisions with sovereignty. As a result, the political decision-making process takes place in small circles, usually in secret. The political participation of the vast majority of the population in the formation of wills and decision-making is severely limited. Where elections take place, their outcome does not endanger the position of the power elite. And where parliaments do exist, they have little power to exercise control – just as courts do not pass judgments that run counter to the vital power interests of the ruling elite.

Loewenstein's approach of distinguishing between autocracy and constitutionalism has been unjustly forgotten in modern autocracy research, because it is far removed from the institutional analysis of older jurisprudential state theory. The institutional arrangement is analyzed in close connection with the political processes, especially the "inter-organ controls of the electorate vis-à-vis government and parliament", the degree of autonomy of local and regional bodies, the arrangement of individual liberties, and the resulting "power dynamics" of group pluralism (Loewenstein 2000: 266–316).

#### IV. Analytical categories and typology

---

The process-oriented distinction between "democracy" and "autocracy" (or "dictatorship", as it is usually called in historiographical discussions; Schmiechen-Ackermann 2002; Hürter/Wentker 2019) in the tradition of Schumpeter (Schumpeter 1987; in line with this, for instance: Acemoglu/Robinson 2006: 17) and Robert A. Dahl (1971: 3) corresponds to Loewenstein's approach in many respects, for the control of power serves political pluralism and presupposes it. The control of power and pluralism establish the "forum type", the development of which Samuel Finer (2003 a: 43) traced from antiquity to the 20th century. Political procedural criteria, such as Adam Przeworski's "contested elections", i.e., elections whose outcome is uncertain and which therefore entail the risk of (partial) loss of power for the rulers, are compatible with Loewenstein's definition of constitutional government. The statement that democracies are systems in which parties lose elections (Przeworski 1991: 10; see also Przeworski/Alvarez/Cheibub/Limongi 2000: 14), however, draws too narrow a line because it also applies to constitutional regimes whose electoral law supports fair competition but does not meet the requirements of democratic elections (the historical minimum condition is usually universal male suffrage; Kailitz 2017 a: 33). The history of British constitutionalism and suffrage in the 18th and 19th centuries illustrates this. The emphasis on the electoral process in defining democracy often leads to neglect of the institutional arrangement. Competitive elections, however, can produce parliaments with weak checks and balances. Most importantly, however, the criterion of democratic elections causes the historical precursors of modern constitutional government to fall into the autocracy zone. If, however, the political system of Great Britain at the beginning of the 19th century (before the democratization of suffrage) falls into the autocracy zone because of its still strongly aristocratic character, historical genealogies become blurred, knowledge of which seems indispensable for the interpretation and appropriate classification of modern constitutional democracies.

Thus, the distinction here is not between democratic and non-democratic systems, but between constitutional government and autocracies. The central criterion for this differentiation is the way in which power is exercised. If the political system has a center of power with at best weak institutional controls, it is an autocracy. Lack of control over power and limited (or even absent) pluralism are two sides of the same coin since the guiding principle of the control of power is to safeguard freedom and plurality. The supremacy of the executive is countered by controlling bodies and independent courts. Opposition is legal and legitimate and is institutionalized in particular in parliaments that emerge from competitive elections. This corresponds to a pluralistic public sphere with an independent media in which criticism of the government can be articulated with impunity.

Table IV.8: Criteria for distinguishing between constitutional governments and autocracies, source: own representation.

| Constitutional Government                 | Autocracy   |
|---|---|
| Effective control of power                | Concentration of power                                  |
| ■ Parliament with extensive control power | ■ Absence of parliament or weak control                 |
| ■ Independent courts                      | ■ Courts are subject to instructions from the executive |
| Pluralism                                 | Lack of/strongly limited pluralism                      |
| ■ Competitive elections                   | ■ Elections with lacking or weak competitiveness        |
| ■ Party pluralism                         | ■ Lack of or severely limited party pluralism           |
| ■ Institutionalized opposition            | ■ Lack of or weak opposition                            |
| ■ Plural, critical public sphere          | ■ Public dominated by the executive                     |

Autocracies, on the other hand, follow the logic of concentrated power. Beyond this central commonality, however, they exhibit major differences. Differences in the way autocracies act can be better understood if they are classified not according to their structures of rule, but according to their underlying guiding ideas and motivational driving forces. The main types of autocracy can be identified according to the respective legitimization of rule, i.e., according to the self-image of the rulers, the intellectual sources from which they draw, and the ideas, attitudes, and value systems with which they justify their rule. It must be borne in mind that it is not uncommon for facade ideologies to be developed that carefully cloud the actual interests of rule with a dense haze of incense. Such "window dressing" is not always easy to see through. This is one of the main problems in distinguishing between different types of legitimating autocracy.

However, it does not seem insurmountable in view of the difficulties that arise from the primary distinction between types of autocracy according to rule accession/the rulers. The typologies of Geddes (1999) and Hadenius/Teorell (2007), for example, which have been widely used in recent autocracy research, level out the serious differences between ideocratic–totalitarian and authoritarian autocracies (which by no means fundamentally calls their usefulness into question). In contrast, the older dichotomy between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, which can be found in many political science textbooks and was developed by Juan J. Linz (2000) (albeit supplemented and modified several times), with its complex linking of categories of rule (ideology, pluralism, participation), is not conclusively derived from basic categories of rule analysis (Merkel 2010: 42; Jesse 2021). The following proposal takes up this criticism and develops Linz's approach in a modifying way.



## VI. Absolutism

### Summary:

Dynastic legitimacy distinguishes constitutionally unrestricted (absolute) monarchies from other forms of autocracy. In some regions of the world, monarchical absolutism defies the expectations of modernization theorists, who assign it little future potential. The unexpected longevity of "family rule" calls for explanations that take into account the complex interplay of legitimatization and structural factors.

### 1. Historical-terminological classification

"Absolutism" as a term for an unrestricted monarchy goes back historically to a decision by the Roman Senate in 24 BC, which declared Augustus *princeps legibus solutus* and thus released him from observing those rights and legal norms that appeared incompatible with the exercise of the public functions of an emperor (Turchetti 2001: 165). But it was not until the reign of Diocletian (Roman emperor from 284–305 AD) that the principate, under the influence of the Hellenic Orient, de facto transformed into a kind of absolute monarchy with dynastic features. The supreme power ("summa potestas") was constitutionally transferred to the still existing Senate upon the princep's death. In practice, however, the emperor ("caesar") usually appointed a family member as heir and endowed him with the "tribunicia potestas" so that his succession could not be disputed. In this way, a path to unrestricted dynastic monarchy was taken, which was to shape the history of Europe for many centuries.

It was not until the 19th century that "absolutism" became the name for a type of state that was "based on the enforcement of the monarchical will over the entire territory of the state with the help of a bureaucracy dependent on the king, a standing army, taxes levied by the king" (Weis 1985: 37), and a high justice concentrated with the king. In reality, in the so-called absolute monarchies there were intermediate powers ("corps intermédiaires") everywhere with varying degrees of influence (Loewenstein 2000: 58 f.; Loewenstein 1952; Asch/Duchhardt 1996), so that the theorists of absolutism assumed a "monarchie limitée" – in contrast to despotism, as it prevailed in the Ottoman Empire, for example. The reality of rule in continental Europe was characterized by the more or less strong repression of these intermediate powers, a process that began as early as the High Middle Ages (the rule of the Staufer Frederick II in Sicily, emperor of the Roman-German Empire from 1220 until his death in 1250, is a striking example of this) and reached a peak as an instrument of pacification in the age of the religious wars. Absolutism in the fully developed sense can be spoken of in Spain as early as during the reign of Philip II (1556–1598), in France beginning with Cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin, and in Germany from the end of the Thirty Years' War onward, where it was not able to establish itself in the empire with its prevailing counterforces, but in many of the territorial states (as opposed to the "free imperial cities").

## VI. Absolutism

---

In the second half of the 18th century, the so-called enlightened absolutism spread under Frederick II in Prussia (1740–1786), Joseph II in Austria (1765–1790), Charles III in Spain (1759–1788), the Marquês de Pombal in Portugal (1756–1777), in Bavaria under Max III Joseph (1745–1777), or in Tuscany under Peter Leopold (1765–1790), characterized by the functionalization and rationalization of kingship. The monarch no longer referred primarily to the divine nature of his power, but to his duties as an organ of state promoting the common good. The enlightened rulers strengthened the rights of the peasants, many of whom were still dependent on fiefdoms, and pursued the juridification of social relations through a judiciary that was gaining in independence. This laid important foundations for the later constitutionalization of absolute monarchies.

Constitutional historians usually determine the transition from absolute to constitutional monarchy in the 19th century based on two factors: the degree of independence of the judiciary and the controlling power of the representative bodies. Wherever influential parliamentary control bodies were lacking, but the dynastically legitimized monarch ruled within the framework of fundamental laws ("leges fundamentales"), one speaks of absolutism. However, as soon as the monarch "was dependent on the approval of parliament not only for the passing of taxes, but also for legislation and the budget, and legislative power was thus exercised jointly by monarch and parliament" (Kirsch 1999: 52), the threshold to a constitutional state was crossed. However, this definition lacks the judiciary, whose power of control is apparently presupposed. Where it shows weaknesses, a constitutional–historical transition zone should be noted.

Regarding the legislature, monarchies are absolute (and autocratic) when the monarchical executive can set and apply norms without depending on the participation of another constitutional body with its own powers. In Europe, many monarchies were constitutionalized as early as the 19th century – mostly in a non-linear process marked by setbacks. The "constitutional monarchy", which was also propagated by liberals in the first half of the 19th century, endowed the monarch with an "absolute veto against laws of parliament" (Beyme 1973: 30). Authors speak of "waves of republicanization" (Friske 2008; Wolf 2016); although the power of monarchs diminished, they often retained their representative-symbolic significance (as in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden). The only absolute monarchies in a strict sense that remained at the threshold of the 20th century were those of the Russian tsar and the Ottoman sultan, whose geographical borders extended far beyond Europe. The Manchu dynasty in China, according to its population the "largest monarchy in the world" (Thieme 2017: 22), was unable to cope with the internal and external challenges of the giant empire and fell victim to a military coup in 1911/12. The First World War is regarded as the trigger of the second "republicanization wave".

But as early as 1910, the Portuguese King Manuel II had to flee into exile. More consequential was the downfall of monarchically ruled empires in or shortly after World War I: In Russia, the tsar fell in 1917; the Ottoman sultan was dethroned a few years later. The (partially) constitutionalized monarchies of Germany, Aus-

tria-Hungary, and Italy transitioned from monarchies to republics. In the Balkans, the remaining monarchies were transformed into royalist dictatorships (supported by the military and effectively suspending existing constitutions), such as Serbia from 1929, Bulgaria from 1935, Romania from 1938. In Greece, too, the end of the monarchy was followed only by a brief republican interlude. The delegitimization of the monarchy prepared the ground for a military-backed autocracy (from 1936).

In some regions of the world outside Europe, largely absolute monarchies have maintained their importance until the present day or experienced some form of revitalization. In many cases, these are products of decolonization, which was not infrequently accompanied by the restoration of patrimonial and patriarchal structures. Absolute monarchies established themselves particularly successfully in the Islamic cultural sphere, where they were often able to anchor themselves on a religious and traditional basis. Samuel Huntington's (1968: 191) prediction grounded in modernization theory that the emergence of new middle classes in oil-rich states would sooner or later bring down the monarchies materialized neither in the years after the first oil crisis (1973) nor in the course of the "Arabellion" (2010–2012). Apparently, they owe their enduring power to factors that remain underexposed in the modernization-theoretical perspective. Surprisingly, Michael Herb's (1999) compilation of overthrown and surviving monarchies in the Near and Middle East (table 11) was still valid more than a decade later.

Table VI.11: *Surviving and overthrown monarchies in the Near and Middle East, source: Herb 1999: 17.*

| Surviving monarchies | Overthrown monarchies with year of overthrow |      |
|----------------------|--|------|
| Bahrain              | Egypt  | 1952 |
| Jordan               | Iraq   | 1958 |
| Kuwait               | Libya  | 1969 |
| Morocco              | Afghanistan                                  | 1973 |
| Oman                 | Iran   | 1979 |
| Qatar                |  |      |
| Saudi Arabia         |  |      |
| United Arab Emirates |  |      |

Absolute monarchies differ from other forms of autocracy in their dynastic legitimacy, but not in the indefiniteness of their term of office (Thieme 2017: 36 f.). However, in academic literature subtypes of "autocratic monarchies" try to account for different degrees of "absoluteness" or formal institutionalization. Tom Thieme distinguishes between "representative" and "limited" monarchies as typical subcases of "autocratic monarchies". The representative monarchical

## VI. Absolutism

---

systems (Cambodia and Malaysia), however, are monarchies only in terms of their form of government (i.e., constitutionally) because the monarchs have no influence on the political decision-making process apart from their representative ceremonial functions. By form of government, they are authoritarian autocracies with hegemonic party systems and parliaments and judiciaries with weak checks and balances (Croissant 2016: 157–200, 241–290). Of greater importance is the distinction between absolute and semi-absolute (in Thieme: "autocratic-limited") monarchies. The autocratic limitation arises from the understanding of office and consists primarily in the fact that the monarch in such political systems exercises power jointly "with a government controlled by him" and "as a rule does not interfere" (Thieme 2017: 49) in its affairs. For 2016, Thieme recorded Bhutan, Kuwait, Morocco, Thailand, and Tonga as "autocratic-limited" and Bahrain, Brunei, Jordan, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Swaziland (as of 2018 "Kingdom of Eswatini"), and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as unrestricted "absolute monarchies".

To better understand the survivability of these regimes, it is necessary to examine their special features in terms of legitimation and structure of rule in comparison to constitutional states on the one hand and other forms of autocracy on the other.

### 2. Legitimation of rule

Dynastic succession is the central distinguishing criterion of (absolute) monarchy. The justified reference to elective kingship (as in the Roman-German Empire or the UAE) does not contradict this, because the election is conducted by an elite body (in the UAE the seven emirs, in the Roman-German Empire the prince-electors), and only those who meet strict succession requirements are eligible for election.

At the same time, dynastic succession is a central source of legitimacy, the drying up of which calls the existence of the monarchy into question. It is associated with *founding myths*, "complexity-reducing stories" (Bernsen 2017: 889) that proclaim the dynasty's chosenness, exquisite origins, outstanding abilities, historical achievements, and heroic deeds. The further back the historical roots reach, the brighter the image of a dynasty shines which, at least in appearance, has withstood all the storms of time. This is also and especially true of those monarchies that were restored after long periods of foreign rule. They symbolize the restoration of an original, authentic, and just order and project elementary socio-psychological needs for collective identity onto a person who connects the living with the generations of the deceased – a feat of legitimacy that is difficult for other types of autocracy to achieve.

The religious motifs of monarchical legitimation of rule have a long tradition. For centuries, the *divine right* was a central source of legitimacy for European monarchies. The court theologian of Louis XIV, the bishop, sought-after pulpit orator, and crown prince's educator Jacques Bénigne Bossuet (1627–1704) defined the state as a Christian community whose basic laws rested on immovable biblical

foundations. The hereditary monarchy was the original order: God was the first king; from him the role was passed on to the forefather Adam, and from it grew paternal authority (Bossuet 1967: 18). This religious legitimization of rule lost importance in the age of Enlightenment and "secularization" but remained effective in parts of the population. The same was true for the idea that the king was a "father of the country" who ruled benevolently over his country children (Loewenstein 1952: 74–76).

Particularly in the Islamic cultural sphere, where the population is strongly influenced by religion, such ideas remain a central source of legitimacy for monarchical systems today. In 2016, of 23 autocracies with state religions, 13 were monarchies, including all the monarchies in Islamic countries (Thieme 2017: 121). All of them pursued an active religious policy including the promotion of the state religion and, in some cases, hostile repression of competing views. In the founding myths of monarchies, national identity concepts are often linked to religious motifs. The monarch symbolizes the unity of the nation; he is the "guarantor of the existence and continuity of the state", as Article 42 of the constitution of the Kingdom of Morocco states.

Above all, he is "Amir al-Muminin", leader of the faithful, who can claim to be of Sharif descent (descendants of the Prophet): The Alawid dynasty, from which King Muhammad VI is descended, traces its family tree – as does the Jordanian royal house, which similarly has an "aura of Islamic credibility" (Schlumberger/Bank 2002: 52) – all the way back to the Prophet. In Morocco, the dynasty has ruled since the 17th century. Under it, the country was able to regain its independence: Sultan Mohammed V was at the head of the Istiqlal movement that freed Morocco from colonial rule in 1956. The king thus symbolizes the political as well as the religious unity of the country.

King Hassan II (who ruled from 1961 to 1999) was also able to defend this unity against internal enemies by surviving two military coups and resisting the strengthening republican, secular, and technocratic movements with successful countermobilization. This strengthened his legitimacy in the eyes of broad segments of the population, especially since he gradually shifted toward a less repressive mode of rule that relied more on co-optation toward the end of his reign (Naguib 2020: 409).

However, Morocco's national identity construction does not combine with a missionary and fundamentalist claim. In this respect, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia forms an antithesis, especially since it does not have a Sharifian lineage. Its founding in 1932 was preceded by several centuries of struggle for autonomy and national unity. According to the key narrative of legitimacy, it began in 1744 with the legendary alliance between Muhammad bin Saud and Imam Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, which linked political and religious goals, unifying the Arabian Peninsula by restoring the "right faith" (Ministry of Culture and Information 2021). The defense of Islam in its authentic shape forms the core of the political and religious ruling ideology. It is linked to many practical tasks, such as controlling education, observing prayer times, prohibiting alcohol consumption,

## X. System transformation

---

in a controlled manner – in the hope of restabilizing rule in this way (Przeworski 1990: 191 f.). Liberation is usually the result of conflicts within the winning coalition, because of which "softliners" move to the top.

Some of the transformation processes that are particularly relevant to autocracy research are explained in more detail in the following sections, with the help of examples. Without claiming to be exhaustive, they deal with processes of transformation, some of which have been well researched and some of which have received little attention.

### 2. Forms of Transformation

#### 2.1 De-democratization

Consolidated constitutional states can collapse in a short time due to external influence: Hitler's "Blitzkrieg" in the West replaced France's III Republic, which had emerged in the 1870 s, with Marshal Pétain's authoritarian regime. Collapses of democracy because of internal shifts in power, on the other hand, are usually the result of developments that drag on over longer periods of time. For the "slow death" of democracy, the concept of *defective democracy* offers a model for analysis. The term can be misunderstood because there is no such thing as a "perfect democracy" and every consolidated constitutional state has deficiencies that become apparent when constitutional claims and reality are compared. Furthermore, "defective democracy" logically presupposes a "functioning democracy". Most importantly though, the concept captures the violation of minimal standards, the undercutting of which leads to gray areas that range between consolidated democracies and autocracies in historical-political reality.

This concept is useful for analyzing processes of de-democratization. Four forms of defective democracy are systematized (Merkel et al. 2003): In *exclusive democracy*, there is inequality of participatory rights. As the historical predecessors of today's democracies show, this does not necessarily impair the effectiveness of checks and balances. The older, aristocratic/monarchical constitutional states, however, could only maintain their stability if they were able to satisfy the growing participation needs of emerging population groups, especially by relaxing restrictions on voting rights. The crisis of Italy's parliamentary monarchy after World War I was also a consequence of the "trasformismo" practiced for a long time, i.e., political "tricking" of and keeping out new population groups (especially workers and the Catholic rural population) eager for participation in favor of the ruling interests of the liberal bourgeoisie (Sturzo 1926; Backes 2017). As is well known, states that were far advanced in constitutionalism, such as Great Britain, were democratized late on, if we take as a yardstick, for example, the introduction of universal male suffrage, which comparatists often see as a historical threshold to democracy (Dahl 1971: 3; Powell 1982: 3; Coppedge/Alvarez/Maldonado 2008). In the present day, "exclusive democracy" mostly means the impairment of electoral equality, as was criticized even in long-established democracies such as the United States during the 2020 presidential campaign

in connection with a "gerrymandering" practice that identified black voters as Democrat supporters (Freedom House 2021).

*Illiberal democracy* covers violations of civil liberties, in particular due to an insufficiently independent judiciary. The problems associated with illiberal democracy are older than the history of modern democracy and are closely linked to the development of constitutional states. Recently, they have been at the center of the European Commission's infringement proceedings against Poland and Hungary for, among other things, jeopardizing the independence of the judiciary, freedom of association, and freedom of the press (Kovács/Scheppele 2018).

*Enclave democracy* refers to the emergence of "states within the state" that are beyond the reach of legitimate institutions. The term is often applied to Latin American countries in which the conditions of "electoral democracy" (Huntington 1991: 7) apply, i.e., free and fair elections function reasonably well, but the military (or other actors with their own means of power, such as guerrillas and organized criminals) is insufficiently controlled and acts as a "reserve power" in the event of political crises (Muno/Thiery 2002).

*Delegative democracy* concerns the loss of the balance of powers through the creation of "super-executives". This usually happens through the election of populist and charismatic presidents (such as Donald Trump in the U.S. or Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil), who go to great lengths to enforce their decision-making power against the judiciary and parliaments, accept bending of the law, and permanently damage rule of law if their mobilization capabilities are not throttled by effective countervailing forces (such as parliaments, courts, critical media).

*Autocratization* is particularly demanding in political systems that have reached a high level of democratic constitutionalism. Marianne Kneuer (2021) has proposed a stage model for such cases, which takes up elements of Karl Dietrich Bracher's "Stages of the Seizure of Power" (Bracher/Sauer/Schulz 1974) and links them with insights from recent autocracy research. The example of Venezuela, on the basis of which she "sequences" the process of the erosion of democracy and establishment of autocracy, lends itself well in this respect because no other country after 1945 has undergone the full journey from consolidated democracy to authoritarian autocracy (Coppedge 2017). Kneuer's model is based on an actor-oriented approach. Autocracy is conceived as the result of the actions of *agents of erosion*, who are intent on changing the rules of the political game (intention), purposefully appropriate means of power to do so (agency), and successfully mobilize supporters. This requires political opportunity structures that enable access to power and its successful defense over a longer period. As in the Weimar case (see Bracher 1955 for a classic description), the journey in Venezuela led through electoral successes that enabled the government to take power and made the subsequent process of concentration of power possible, which weakened the institutions of control and the opposition.

Stage models do not necessarily presuppose far-reaching planning of autocratization. Actors' actions will always display a certain degree of improvisation. In pursuing their long-term goals, they exploit favorable constellations (especially

## X. System transformation

---

weaknesses of their opponents). The example of Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan shows how cunning they can sometimes be. As in Venezuela, his access to power was achieved through electoral success. To remain in power in the face of declining approval ratings and a wave of protests (2013) that was suppressed only with difficulty, the inner circle of power pursued the goal of changing the conditions of competition in the party system in such a way that the formation of a strong opposition and its resurgence would be prevented. Attempts to install a presidential system "alla Turca" failed in 2015 due to a lack of the necessary majorities. But the military coup of July 2016 opened a window of opportunity for far-reaching constitutional amendments aimed at strengthening the presidential executive (Tokatlı 2020: 327–389). Professional observers now soon spoke of a "competitive authoritarian regime" (Esen/Gumuscu 2018: 350). At the actor level, this was prepared, among other things, by the co-optation of potential rivals to the ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP): Thus, an influential Erdoğan critic, Süleyman Soylu, was introduced to the party that supported the regime and given ministerial dignities. As minister of the interior, he now had the task of keeping the protests on the streets small. Rivals who did not allow themselves to be co-opted were politically put out of action: Selahattin Demirtaş, who had challenged much of the ruling party in the June 2015 elections with his Kurdish party (the election was repeated because of this), was remanded in custody a year after the new elections of November 2015 and only received a verdict years later for alleged misconduct dating far back. When Ekrem İmamoğlu ended the governing party's rule in the March 2019 municipal elections in Istanbul, Erdoğan forced a re-election, but it ended with an even higher result for the National Alliance candidate. Various attempts followed to take legal action on flimsy charges against the newly elected mayor (Mumay 2021). The case demonstrated both the (semi-)competitiveness of elections and the lack of independence of a lenient judiciary.

### 2.2 Despotization

Berk Esen and Sebnem Gumuscu explain Turkey's de-democratization and auto-cratization with a *triangular dependency approach* that combines political economy and coalition theory considerations. They speak of an "extensive accumulation of capital and allocation of resources to a cross-class coalition between an emerging economic elite" (Esen/Gumuscu 2020: 6) and urban lower classes, which was formed under the leadership of the AKP against a long-standing alliance of secular middle and upper classes. This has led to the emergence of *corrupt clientelist networks*, which the ruling party has linked to "crony businesses" (preferably in the energy and construction sectors) as well as to social groups at the bottom of the income scale that benefit from a wide range of social services. Through the selective and non-transparent awarding of public contracts with large financial volumes, the AKP government has tied companies loyal to the regime to itself, which in turn provided resources to support voters loyal to the AKP (for example, by issuing food vouchers and granting cash allowances). In return, recipients of state support provided the government with democratic legitimacy. The beneficiaries of the system on both sides (companies as well as



social benefit recipients) were united in their interest in maintaining the AKP's political hegemony.

Critics have given Turkish President Erdoğan the title of "sultan". The *sultanization* of Turkey occurred through a process of de-democratization similar to that described by Mark R. Thompson for the Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos in the early 1970s. The "clientelist democracy" (Thompson 1998: 208) developed into despotism because Marcos purposefully used his steadily increasing access to resources to integrate institutions such as the military and the judiciary into his elite cartel and thus deprive them of their independence. Postcolonial liberation movements such as the precursors of the Tunisian RCD also followed this path. Under Ben Ali, the state party lost its ideological compass, while political patronage gained central importance (Jebnoun 2014: 110; Sassoon 2016: 48).

A more recent example was provided by Nicaragua, which, under Daniel Ortega and his Sandinista National Liberation Front FSLN (from 2006), moved closer in nature to the regime of the Somoza clan, which was overthrown by the Sandinistas in 1979. The former liberator gradually broke with all the ideals of the Sandinista Revolution and integrated sections of the elite (such as representatives of the Catholic clergy and private business potentates) into his "winning coalition", some of whom he had previously fought to the death. Thus, the leftist revolutionary populist transformed himself into a "neopatrimonial dictator in the older Latin American style" (Thaler 2017: 157). The *despotization* of Nicaragua was "lubricated" to a considerable extent with Venezuelan oil. Ortega's power circle secured immediate access to the proceeds of the Nicaraguan–Venezuelan state-owned conglomerate "Albanisa", which evolved from an oil-importing company into a family-owned corporation under the control of close confidants and the president's sons. Due to Ortega's heart disease, his politically influential wife Rosario Murillo, who served as the official government spokeswoman for a long time, gained more and more influence in the inner circle of power. At the same time, the FSLN lost importance as a regime party. Family members gained control over several media companies.

Linz/Stepan and, in their wake, Peter Gelius have systematically examined the *despotization of ideocratic* rule. Linz/Stepan (1996: 344) called Ceaușescu's Romania "post-totalitarianism cum sultanism". Totalitarianism weakened, while despotic features of rule emerged more strongly in Ceaușescu's regime: personalism (personality cult, family rule), increased personal arbitrariness, and the loss of importance of the Marxist-Leninist state ideology in favor of Ceaușecu's idiosyncratic opportunistic interpretations of the world. Peter Gelius put Romania, Castro's Cuba, and North Korea side by side. In doing so, he identified the main phases of their development from their totalitarian beginnings to them becoming variants of totalitarian (North Korea) or post-totalitarian sultanism (Romania and Cuba). For each phase, he strictly systematically worked out the characteristics of their political leadership, the extent of (limited) pluralism in the economy and society, the development of a state ideology, and the mobilization efforts of the ruling elite to capture their continuities and discontinuities. According to Gelius, the processes of sultanization were reflected above all in the extent of

## X. System transformation

---

personalization of the ideology and the closest leadership circle. For Cuba, he noted a lesser degree of sultanization and explained this, among other things, with the modest lifestyle of the Castro brothers. Gelius saw the fact that the tendencies toward a personality cult on the Caribbean island lagged far behind North Korean and Romanian practice primarily as a consequence of the authentic charisma of Fidel Castro, whose legitimacy, moreover, had been based on the greater autonomy of the Cuban Revolution, while Kim Il-sung and Ceaușescu owed their rule to foreign powers, no matter how much they later sought to emphasize their independence (Gelius 2013: 409–412).

### 2.3 De-totalitarianization and re-totalitarianization

In Gelius and Linz/Stepan, sultanization/despotization is part of the concept of *de-totalitarianization*, which is one of the best-researched transformations of autocratic regimes (Backes 2009). The gap between totalitarian claims and reality was already inherent in the polarity of type formation (Sartori 1999) and the subject of critical examination of concepts of totalitarianism from the 1960s onward (see, for example, Ludz 1974). In a strict sense, no historical regime fulfilled, for a longer period, all the requirements that Hannah Arendt (2005: 944–979), for example, based her demanding, ideology- and terror-focused, concept of totalitarianism on. Even Stalin's rule, for example during the war years, underwent a temporary/sectoral decline in repression and terror (Altrichter 2000: 109). After Stalin's death, partial de-totalitarianization set in, which was associated, among other things, with a more restrained and predictable control practice, the reduction of the camp system, and modest but still noticeable cultural re-pluralization. In late socialism, mass terror was completely absent, the former totalitarian dynamic with its chiliastic promises having solidified into bureaucratic procedures. The 1980s brought a renewed surge of de-totalitarianization, the intensity of which varied considerably from country to country. It started in Poland, where the Catholic Church held a significant position of power and where the visit of the Polish pope in June 1979 had spurred the self-confidence of the faithful population in the face of state power. It spread to the Soviet hegemon with Mikhail Gorbachev's accession to power in 1985, who attempted to reform the encrusted system under the slogans "perestroika" and "glasnost", thus unleashing a de-totalitarianization dynamic of change that would soon shake the basic autocratic structures of Russia and its satellite states.

The processes of de-totalitarianization largely brought about a rapprochement with more "ordinary" forms of autocracy, but nowhere did they progress so far that the traces of high totalitarianism disappeared completely. Long before the end of real socialism, researchers had tried to give the change appropriate conceptual expression. In 1970, Richard Löwenthal, an expert on Eastern Europe, was one of the first to speak of a change to "post-totalitarian" (Löwenthal 2009 a: 596) authoritarianism. In the international discussion, the term *post-totalitarianism* became common, which Juan J. Linz (2000: 252) systematically unfolded in the mid-1970s. Totalitarian traits had by no means disappeared in the regimes described in this manner, but they had weakened in a significant way. Although

## Index of Subjects

### A

acclamation 116, 136  
actor theory 16  
Afghanistan 63, 93, 133  
agents of erosion 125  
AGIL scheme 15  
Algeria 77, 78  
anabaptists 85  
anti-communism 110, 113  
anti-fascism 92, 110, 137, 138  
anti-semitism 92  
Arabellion 22, 47, 63, 78, 81, 146  
Arcana imperii 138  
Argentina 76, 77, 133  
aristocracy 35, 37, 38  
Austria 62, 63, 70, 135  
autocratization 125

### B

Bahrain 63, 64, 66–68, 146  
Balilla 96  
Bangladesh 9  
Beijing 89, 91, 109, 118, 131, 134, 146  
Belarus 74, 77, 80, 108  
Bhutan 64  
Bolivarian revolution 73, 146  
Bolivia 146  
Bolshevism 86, 87  
Bonapartism 70  
Brazil 70, 125  
Brunei 64, 66–68  
Bulgaria 63, 129  
bureaucracy 61

### C

Cambodia 64, 98  
case studies 20, 73  
Caudillismo 49  
central round table 136, 138–140  
charisma 111, 128  
Chile 76  
China, People's Republic 9, 10, 22, 62,  
73, 74, 78, 82, 83, 91, 95, 97, 100,  
108, 109, 116, 119, 131, 132, 144–147

civic culture 123  
civil society 123, 130  
claim to absoluteness 47, 63, 86  
clientelism 15, 51, 52, 67, 133  
Colombia 58  
colonialism 74, 75  
common good orientation 35, 38  
communication 10, 15, 24, 38, 49, 88, 97,  
106, 118  
communism 91, 96, 110, 113, 130, 138  
comparison, diachronic 20  
comparison, interimperial 20  
comparison, interpersonal 19, 20, 106  
comparison, interregional 19, 20  
comparison, intertemporal 20  
comparison, synchronous 20  
competitiveness 45  
concentration camp 87, 88, 98–100  
concentration of powers 45, 125  
confucianism 17, 74, 75  
Congo 9, 46, 50, 53, 54  
consolidation 122  
control capability 27  
control of powers 130  
control, social 119  
corruption 23, 75  
coup 57, 62, 69, 72, 81, 126  
CPSU 53, 96, 134  
Crimea 73  
Cuba 20, 46, 49, 50, 76, 92, 110, 127,  
128  
cult of personality 111  
Czechoslovakia 94, 129, 130

### D

deconsolidation 122, 134  
democide 99  
democracy  
– defective 124, 144  
– delegative 125  
– exclusive 18, 39, 41, 46, 54, 59, 67,  
89–91, 93, 124  
– illiberal 125, 145  
depoliticization 39

## Index of Subjects

---

despotization 126  
Dictator's Dilemma 15  
disloyalty 42, 105  
domination 13, 38, 41, 69, 93, 95, 133  
Dominican Republic 49, 53, 58  
dual state 95  
dynasty 47, 55, 62, 64, 65, 68, 93, 107,  
111, 115

### E

Egypt 9, 63, 78  
election  
– Manipulation 24, 59, 67, 79, 91, 116  
elective Kingship 64  
empire 49, 61, 64, 70, 93  
Empire, German 61, 64  
enclave democracy 125  
end of history 10  
enemy images 98, 138  
Equatorial Guinea 46  
estates 46, 92  
Eswatini, Swaziland 64  
Ethiopia 9  
ethnocentrism 59, 99  
evolution 21, 122  
exclusion 66  
extreme 37  
extremism 131, 144, 145

### F

Falange 78  
fanaticism 46, 85  
fascism 38, 70, 86, 89, 91, 92, 110, 137,  
138  
Florence 85  
founding myth 111  
France 61, 85, 115, 124  
Free German Youth (Freie Deutsche Ju-  
gend) 96  
French Revolution 36, 85  
fundamentalism 11, 13, 15, 18, 23, 30,  
45, 62, 65, 70, 95, 98, 105, 113, 117,  
138, 145

### G

GDR 19, 94, 96, 97, 100, 129, 133–135,  
137, 138, 140

genocide 99  
Georgia 73  
gerrymandering 79, 125  
Glasnost 128, 134  
God 37, 53, 65, 72, 89, 90, 93, 94  
Great Britain 17, 44, 124  
Greece 17, 63  
GULag 92, 100

### H

Habsburgs 114  
Haiti 46, 49, 53  
hardliner 130, 131  
hegemonic party 64, 75, 79, 81, 82  
Hitler Youth 96  
Holodomor 98  
Hong Kong 109  
Hungary 63, 100, 125, 129–131, 135,  
144, 145  
hybrid regimes 133  
hybridization 132

### I

iconoclasm 93  
ideologization 39, 71, 131  
ideology  
– open and closed 129  
– totalitarian 14, 38, 45, 50, 70–73,  
85–94, 96–99, 107, 112, 114, 117,  
118, 127–129, 131, 132, 138  
idolocracy 38  
imperialism 74, 110  
India 143  
indoctrination 41, 42, 66, 96, 97  
Indonesia 9, 133  
institutionalization 13, 122  
institutions  
– formal 15, 58, 63, 113, 119, 122  
– informal 15, 42, 51, 58, 114, 122, 123  
integration 15, 30, 42, 66, 75, 82, 94,  
105, 114–117, 138  
Iran 9, 63, 93, 94, 108, 146  
Iraq 63, 93, 133  
Islamic State 93  
islamism 93  
Italy 38, 63, 70, 86, 87, 89, 94, 95, 99,  
124

**J**

Jacobin 85  
Japan 133  
Jordan 63, 64, 67, 68  
Juche 93, 112  
judiciary 15, 26, 28, 57, 62, 68, 82,  
125–127, 139

**K**

KGB 73, 99, 100  
Khmer Rouge 98  
kleptocracy 46  
Komsomol 96  
Kuwait 63, 64, 67, 68, 106

**L**

Laogai 100, 131  
Laos 78  
Lebanon 146  
legitimation of rule 21, 42, 53, 64, 71, 88,  
106  
leninism 74, 89, 91  
leverage 119, 147  
Lex Salica 56  
liberalization 123  
Libya 63, 78  
linkage 12, 76, 119, 147  
Lithuania 74  
loyalty 42

**M**

Malaysia 64, 75, 132  
manichaeism 93, 110  
manipulation 24, 59, 67, 79, 91, 116  
maoism 22, 74, 82, 83, 89, 91, 98, 100,  
131  
marxism-leninism 74, 89  
mass manipulation 96  
mass mobilization 88, 94  
mass organizations 96, 112, 129, 136,  
138  
mass terror 88, 119, 128  
media control 96, 97, 115  
mentality 39, 47, 69, 71, 73, 75, 93, 99,  
100, 106, 138  
Mexico 9, 132

military 14, 26, 77, 115  
military regime 78  
militia 86  
Ministry of State Security 100  
mission 73, 74, 93, 110, 113  
mobilization 39, 78, 87, 88, 94, 96, 112,  
115, 125, 127, 135, 138  
moderation 36  
modernization 17, 110  
monitoring 115  
Morocco 63–65, 67, 68, 108  
Moscow 23, 55, 73, 74, 89, 91, 134, 135  
movement regime 78  
multi-party regime, limited 39, 77–81,  
114  
Münster, Westphalia 85  
Myanmar 77, 78, 115

**N**

national socialism 19, 90, 96  
nationalism 71–74, 131  
nazi regime 19, 53, 87, 89, 92, 95, 98,  
114, 123  
néo-Destour 79  
neo-institutionalism 15  
neopatrimonialism 51  
Nicaragua 49, 122, 127, 146  
Nigeria 9, 133  
no party regime 77  
noirism 54  
North Korea 20, 50, 93, 97, 112, 115,  
127, 146  
Norway 62, 103  
NSDAP 95, 96, 99

**O**

objective opponents 87, 119  
ochlocracy 38  
oligarchs 24, 114  
oligarchy 35, 38  
Oman 63, 64, 66, 67, 106  
one-party regime 77  
opposition 44, 80, 117  
organizational power 118  
Ottoman Empire 49, 61, 93

## Index of Subjects

---

### P

Pakistan 9, 77  
palingenetic myths 91  
paramilitary 57, 95  
Paris 96  
parousia delay 113  
participation 39, 51  
Partito Nazionale Fascista 95  
patrimonialism 50  
patronage networks 52  
People's Action Party 79  
performance 105  
performance dilemma 106, 145  
Peru 76  
Philippines 10, 46, 50, 59, 127  
plebiscite 70  
pluralism, limited 45, 76, 82  
Poland 17, 73, 100, 121, 125, 128–131, 144  
police, political 86, 99  
polyarchy 136, 138, 140  
polycracy 95, 114  
populism 10, 145  
Portugal 17, 62, 70  
post-totalitarianism 88, 127–129, 131, 134  
potemkin facade of legitimacy 46, 54  
power  
– despotic 14  
– ideological 14  
– infrastructural 14, 99  
propaganda 42, 59, 96, 97  
protest 78, 91, 109, 115, 118, 141  
Prussia 47, 62, 115  
public 23, 31, 45, 60

### Q

Qatar 63, 64, 67, 68, 106

### R

racism 98  
rational choice 17, 21, 22, 114  
reautocratization 83  
rebel regime 73, 115, 146  
rebellion 146  
recentralization 83, 131

regime change 121, 122  
regime transformation 121  
reideologization 131  
religion, political 86, 89  
representation of the people 37  
repression 32, 80, 118  
republicanization waves 62  
resistance 103, 115, 117, 141  
revolution 36, 73, 85, 86, 90–92, 127, 128, 146  
Roman Empire 93  
Romania 20, 50, 63, 127, 129  
Russia 9, 23, 38, 62, 70, 73, 74, 77, 80–83, 86, 87, 89, 94, 95, 109, 119, 128, 133, 145, 146

### S

samizdat 97  
sandinistas 127  
satellite states 89, 94, 95, 100, 121, 128, 134  
Saudi Arabia 63–65, 67, 68, 107, 108, 146  
security apparatus 57, 67, 109, 138, 140  
security services 42, 56, 115  
SED 19, 97, 112, 134–141  
selectorate 16  
semi-opposition 60, 75, 76, 81, 116, 117  
Serbia 63  
shadow society 129  
sharia 66  
sharif hereditary line 65  
Singapore 74, 75, 79, 82, 106, 132, 145  
social engineering 92, 132  
social media 118  
socialism 19, 90, 96  
sociocide 99  
sociology of rule 13, 14, 49, 50  
Songbun 93  
South Africa 132  
South Korea 97  
Soviet Union 10, 38, 53, 85, 87–89, 94, 95, 97–100, 121, 134, 135  
Spain 17, 38, 61, 62, 72, 78, 81, 87, 113, 121  
stalinism 53, 138

- state collapse 42, 97, 105, 121, 124, 139, 141  
state doctrine 54, 70, 93  
statehood 26, 113  
Stronnictwo Demokratyczne 130  
succession 111  
Sudan 147  
sultanism 50, 51  
sultanization 127, 128  
superexecutive 125, 146  
suppression 103  
Swaziland, Eswatini 64, 67  
Syria 23, 78, 93, 146  
system change 121–123, 134  
system transformation 121  
systems theory 15, 17
- T**  
Taiwan 119, 132  
Taliban 93  
terror 32, 33, 99  
terrorism 33  
Thailand 10, 64  
Tibet 83  
totalitarianism 39, 86, 87, 127  
transition, negotiated 133  
transitional authoritarianism 134, 135, 138, 140  
triangular dependency 126  
tsardom 62, 73, 93  
Tunisia 78, 79, 81  
Turkey 9, 53, 70, 122, 126, 127, 133  
Turkmenistan 46, 50, 54, 59, 60
- tyranny 35, 38
- U**  
Uganda 57  
Ukraine 73, 98, 133  
ulema 68  
ultranationalism 89  
United Arab Emirates 63, 64  
USA 23, 25, 99  
usurpation 36, 74
- V**  
value system 96  
Venezuela 73, 122, 125, 126, 133, 146  
Vietnam 9, 78, 146  
violence 32
- W**  
wahhabism 68  
winning coalition 16, 58, 78, 124, 127  
World War I 38, 62, 98, 107, 124  
World War II 73, 95, 98, 113
- X**  
Xinjiang 83, 131
- Y**  
Yemen 78  
youth organizations 41, 96
- Z**  
Zaire 50, 57  
Zimbabwe 119, 147

## Index of Names

### A

Abdel Jelil, Mohamed 93  
Abou-Chadi, Tarik 28, 30  
Acemoglu, Daron 16, 44  
Ackeret, Markus 74, 109  
Addio, Mario d' 86  
Al-Assad, Bashar 55, 146  
Al-Assad, Hafiz 55  
Al-Gaddafi, Muammar 55, 112  
Al Khalifa, Hamad bin Isa (Bahrain) 67  
Al-Rasheed, Madawi 67  
Al-Sadat, Anwar 72  
Aliyev, Heydar 23, 53, 112  
Aliyev, Ilham 23, 112  
Almond, Gabriel A. 14, 15, 71, 103, 104  
Altrichter, Helmut 114, 128  
Alvarez, Angel 44  
Alvarez, Michael E. 27  
Aly, Götz 89  
Amendola, Giovanni 86  
Angermüller, Johannes 22  
Apor, Balázs 53  
Appian 36  
Auarone, Alberto 95  
Arendt, Hannah 11, 12, 87–89, 92, 98,  
119, 128, 147  
Aristotle 13, 19, 35–37, 41, 46, 49  
Aron, Raymond 71, 89  
Asch, Ronald G. 61  
Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal Pasha 70  
Augustus (Gaius Octavius) 61

### B

Bach, Maurizio 95  
Backes, Uwe 11, 12, 17, 20, 85–87, 107,  
124, 128, 134, 145  
Bader, Julia 146  
Balík, Stanislav 71, 96  
Bank, André 9, 18, 24, 25, 52, 65, 67,  
140  
Basedau, Matthias 20  
Batista, Fulgencio 46, 49, 59, 60  
Bauer, Yehuda 93

Beblawi, Hazem 16  
Becker, Manuel 46  
Bedford, Sofie 81  
Beetham, David 109, 112  
Behrends, Jan C. 53  
Bell, Daniel 10  
Belleau, Jean-Philippe 54, 56  
Bellin, Eva 118  
Ben Ali, Zine el-Abidine 79, 81, 127  
Benedicto, Roberto 59  
Berdimuhamedov, Gurbanguly 46, 53, 56,  
59, 60  
Berdyayev, Nikolai 86  
Berg-Schlosser, Dirk 119  
Berger, Peter L. 13  
Bermeo, Nancy 122  
Bernholz, Peter 11, 46  
Bernsen, Michael 64  
Besier, Gerhard 11, 88  
Beyme, Klaus von 15, 19, 20, 62, 145  
Bialas, Wolfgang 11  
Biden, Joe 144  
Black, Ann 66, 109  
Bluntschli, Johann Caspar 37, 38, 85  
Bodin, Jean 36  
Boese, Vanessa A. 144  
Bogaards, Matthijs 122, 132  
Böge, Friederike 109  
Bohdan, Siarhei 81  
Bohr, Annette 50  
Bolsonaro, Jair 23, 125  
Borkenau, Franz 87  
Böss, Otto 86  
Bossuet, Jacques Bénigne 64, 65  
Bosworth, Richard James Boon 99  
Bourguiba, Habib 79  
Bracher, Karl Dietrich 89, 97, 114, 123,  
125  
Brand, Alexander 147  
Bratton, Michael 56  
Breuer, Stefan 13, 95  
Brooker, Paul 145  
Broszat, Martin 100



- Brown, Archie 91, 95  
Browning, Christopher 19, 20  
Brownlee, Jason 56, 114, 115  
Brunnbauer, Ulf 94  
Brunner, Georg 41, 96  
Brzezinski, Zbigniew 38, 87, 88, 91, 99  
Buchheim, Hans 100  
Budge, Ian 22  
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce 16, 17, 22, 58, 114  
Buhbe, Matthes 81  
Bullock, Alan 19, 20, 100  
Bumbacher, Stephan Peter 91
- C
- Caesar, Gaius Julius 36, 69  
Cambronne, Luckner 57  
Campos, Francisco 70  
Capoccia, Giovanni 10  
Carothers, Thomas 108, 132  
Cassani, Andrea 144  
Castells, Manuel 118  
Castro, Fidel 20, 60, 92, 110, 111, 115, 127, 128  
Castro, Raúl 20, 60, 92, 110, 111, 115, 127, 128  
Cavuldak, Ahmet 12  
Ceașescu, Nicolae 20, 50, 127, 128  
Chang, Eric 58, 100  
Chang, Jung 58, 100  
Charles III (Spain) 62  
Chávez, Hugo 73, 146  
Chehabi, Houchang E. 20, 46, 49, 50, 53, 55, 94  
Cheibub, José Antonio 27, 29, 31, 32, 44, 76  
Chepikova, Ksenia 83  
Chevallier, Jean-Jacques 70  
Chew, Sing C. 75  
Christensen, Britt 118  
Cingranelli, David L. 25  
Cobban, Alfred 69  
Colas, Dominique 92  
Collins, Robert 93  
Conac, Gérard 70  
Conteh-Morgan, Earl 147  
Coppedge, Michael 124, 125  
Cornett, Linda 32  
Corni, Gustavo 95  
Coser, Lewis A. 71  
Courtois, Stéphane 100  
Croissant, Aurel 26, 57, 64, 66, 68, 77–79, 106, 115  
Cromwell, Oliver 69  
Cuenca, Rodolfo 59  
Czap, Hans J. 59
- D
- Dabag, Mihran 98  
Dahl, Robert A. 16, 44, 124  
Debiel, Tobias 59  
Demandt, Alexander 35  
Demirtaş, Selahattin 126  
Demmelhuber, Thomas 146  
Deng Xiaoping 116, 131  
Denison, Michael 53  
Désinor, Clovis 56  
Diamond, Larry 118, 122, 132, 133  
Diocletian, Gaius Aurelius Valerius 61  
Dipper, Christof 96  
Do, Quy-Toan 13, 111  
Dollfuß, Engelbert 70  
Domínguez, Jorge I. 59, 60  
Downs, Anthony 10, 16  
Downs, William E. 10, 16  
Drath, Martin 46, 88, 96  
Duchhardt, Heinz 61  
Duterte, Rodrigo 23  
Duvalier, François 49, 54–58, 60  
Duvalier, Jean-Claude 49, 54–58, 60
- E
- Easton, David 14, 41, 121  
Eckstein, Harry 103  
Edelman, Murray 18  
Eisenstadt, Shmuel N. 50  
Elbers, Helmut 68  
Eltchaninoff, Michel 73  
Elzinga-Marshall, Gabrielle 25  
Engels, Frederick 89  
Engler, Sarah 28, 30, 78

## Index of Names

---

- Enrile, Juan Ponce 59  
Erdle, Stefan 79, 82  
Erdmann, Gero 12, 52, 112, 122  
Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip 126, 127  
Eschenauer-Engler, Tanja 26, 78  
Eschenauer, Tanja 26, 78  
Esen, Berk 126
- F**
- Fainsod, Merle 96  
Falter, Jürgen W. 96  
Finer, Samuel H. 14, 43, 44, 72  
Fitzpatrick, Sheila 99  
Foucault, Michel 18  
Fraenkel, Ernst 16, 82, 95  
Franco, Francisco 38, 47, 71, 72, 78, 81, 113  
François, Patrick 54, 56–58, 82  
Frank, Rüdiger 97, 112  
Frankenberg, Günther 22  
Frankenberger, Rolf 18  
Frantz, Erica 27, 57, 58, 76, 82  
Franzinelli, Mimmo 95  
Frederick II (Hohenzollern) 47  
Frederick II (Staufen) 61  
Freeden, Michael 71, 72  
Fricke, Karl Wilhelm 134, 137  
Frie, Ewald 105  
Friedrich, Carl J. 15, 38, 87, 88, 91, 99  
Friske, Tobias 62  
Fritze, Lothar 11, 91  
Fritzsche, Erik 93  
Fuchs, Dieter 106  
Fukuyama, Francis 10, 146, 147  
Fulbrook, Mary 96  
Fürtig, Henner 66
- G**
- Gallus, Alexander 12, 19, 35  
Gandhi, Jennifer 27, 29, 58, 76, 82, 114, 117  
Gängel, Andreas 139  
Garcelon, Marc 94  
Gauchet, Marcel 89, 93  
Gause, F. Gregory 68  
Gawrich, Andrea 59  
Geddes, Barbara 27, 39, 45, 57, 76, 82, 105, 115  
Geerts, Clifford 18  
Geiger, Theodor 47, 71, 73  
Gelius, Peter 20, 50, 127, 128  
Gellately, Robert 99  
Gemilere, Jordan 67  
Gentile, Emilio 86, 91, 95  
Gerlach, Manfred 136  
Gerschewski, Johannes 11, 93, 105, 115  
Gibas, Monika 97  
Gibney, Mark 32  
Gieseke, Jens 100  
Gilley, Bruce 74  
Ginsburg, Tom 22, 82  
Glosemeyer, Iris 68  
Goebel, Christian 11, 95  
Goemans, Hein E. 56  
Golden, Miriam A. 58  
Gorbachev, Mikhail 128, 130, 134, 135, 141  
Grabowsky, Ingo 97  
Grashoff, Udo 11  
Grauvogel, Julia 75  
Gray, Matthew 52, 90  
Gray, Phillip W. 52, 90  
Greiner, Bettina 99  
Griffin, Roger 11, 46, 91  
Groshek, Jacob 118  
Guevara, Ernesto ('Che') 93  
Gümüüşçü (Gumuscu), Şebnem 126  
Guo, Sujian 131  
Gurian, Waldemar 87  
Gurr, Ted Robert 25, 103  
Gyges of Lydia, King 36
- H**
- Hachtmann, Rüdiger 114  
Hackenesch, Christine 146  
Hadenius, Axel 39, 45, 47, 76–79  
Hale, Henry E. 52, 53, 59, 112  
Haller, Carl Ludwig von 85  
Hallgarten, George W. F. 69  
Halliday, Jon 100  
Hansen, Edward C. 49

- Hartlyn, Jonathan 57–59  
Hassan II (Morocco) 65  
Havel, Václav 129  
Hawk, David 98  
Hayes, Carlton J. H. 87  
Heilmann, Sebastian 74, 83, 116  
Hein-Kircher, Heidi 53  
Heinritz, Katrin 46, 53  
Helmke, Gretchen 15  
Henschel, Sandro 55  
Herb, Michael 63, 67, 68  
Hermet, Guy 116  
Hertle, Hans-Hermann 134  
Hertog, Steffen 67  
Hertz, Aleksander 94  
Heydemann, Günther 12, 19, 20, 86, 97  
Hilberg, Raul 98  
Hirschman, Albert O. 135  
Hitler, Adolf 19, 87, 89, 90, 92, 95, 96,  
98, 99, 124  
Hobbes, Thomas 105  
Hobsbawm, Eric 108  
Hoffer, Eric 91, 96  
Hoffmann, Bert 112  
Holbig, Heike 74  
Holzweißig, Gunter 138  
Honecker, Erich 134–136, 138, 141  
Horák, Slavomír 54–56, 59, 108  
Howard, Marc Morjé 115  
Hudson, Michael C. 47  
Hulicka, Karel 96  
Huntington, Samuel P. 11, 17, 63, 79,  
106, 107, 109, 115, 125, 144, 145  
Hürten, Heinz 87  
Hürter, Johannes 44  
Hurwitz, Leon 103  
Hüttenberger, Peter 19, 20
- I**  
Idi Amin Dada 57  
Imamoğlu, Ekrem 126  
Inglehart, Ronald 104  
Isaacs, Rico 81  
Ishboldin, Boris 86
- J**  
Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf 100  
Jäger, Wolfgang 135  
Jahr, Christoph 99  
Jallot, Nicolas 57  
Jänicke, Martin 87  
Jaraus, Konrad 141  
Jaskułowski, Tytus 11, 130  
Jebnoun, Noureddine 127  
Jellinek, Georg 37, 38, 113  
Jesse, Eckhard 11, 12, 19, 45, 87, 134,  
137, 144  
Jilge, Wilfried 73  
Joseph II (Austria) 62
- K**  
Kaczyński, Jarosław 144  
Kailitz, Steffen 11, 17, 39, 44, 72, 96,  
109, 116, 119, 122  
Kaltenborn, Steffie 19, 20  
Kaminski, Andrzej 99, 100  
Kaminski, Lukasz 99, 100  
Karl, Terry L. 38, 43, 70, 123, 125, 132  
Kästner, Antje 146  
Kauff, Oliver 25  
Kechichian, Joseph A. 66  
Kershaw, Ian 89  
Khashoggi, Jamal 67  
Khomeini, Ruhollah al-Musawi 94  
Khramov, Viktor 59  
Kielmansegg, Peter Graf 12, 88, 104  
Kiernan, Ben 98, 99  
Kim Il-sung 112, 128  
Kind-Kovács, Friederike 97  
Kirsch, Martin 62, 70  
Kirshner, Alexander 10  
Klingemann, Hans-Dieter 22  
Kloth, Hans Michael 112, 134, 139, 140  
Klump, Brigitte 97  
Knecht, Elham Manea 67  
Kneuer, Marianne 12, 72, 73, 112, 113,  
122, 125, 146  
Kocka, Jürgen 88  
Koehler, Kevin 147  
Kohl, Helmut 141

## Index of Names

---

- Kollmorgen, Raj 16, 121  
Köllner, Patrick 20, 116  
Korte, Karl-Rudolf 141  
Koselleck, Reinhart 22  
Kovács, Kriszta 97, 125  
Kramer, Alan 99  
Krämer, Raimund 71  
Krenz, Egon 136  
Krug, Wilhelm Traugott 85  
Kryshtanovskaia, Olga V. 122  
Kubát, Michal 71  
Kuehn, David 57, 77, 78  
Kühl, Stefan 99  
Kunysz, Nicholas 50  
Kunze, Thomas 53, 55
- L**
- Lambrecht, Ronald 88  
Landau, Julia 100  
Landry, Pierre-François 82, 83  
Lange, Kai-Olaf 93, 130  
Lange, Sebastian 93, 130  
Lapp, Peter Joachim 136  
Laruelle, Marlène 73  
Lauth, Hans-Joachim 15, 20, 25, 27, 133  
Lee Kuan Yew 75  
Leemann, Lucas 28  
Leese, Daniel 74  
Leiß, Olaf 83  
Lemkin, Raphael 99  
Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich 53, 89–92, 97  
Leo, Henry 46, 85  
Leopold, Martin 57, 62  
Leppert, Manuel 83  
Lesage, Laurent 57  
Leshchenko, Natalia 74  
Levitsky, Steven 10, 15, 79–81, 115, 118, 119, 132, 144  
Lewis, Charles 23, 71  
Libman, Alexander 83  
Liebknecht, Karl 134  
Limongi, Fernando 27, 29, 31, 32, 44  
Lindberg, Staffan I. 25, 122, 144, 145  
Lindenberger, Thomas 12, 88, 118  
Liniger-Goumaz, Max 46  
Linz, Juan J. 11, 12, 20, 38, 39, 45–47, 49, 50, 53, 55, 71–73, 75, 76, 78, 81, 88, 89, 96, 99, 114, 127–129, 132, 134, 138, 144  
Lipset, Seymour Martin 17, 106  
Lockwood, David 116  
Loewenstein, Karl 38, 42–44, 61, 65, 66, 69–71, 116  
Lohmann, Heiner 112  
Longerich, Peter 100  
Louis XIV (France) 64  
Löwenthal, Richard 88, 128  
Lübbe, Hermann 11  
Luciani, Giacomo 16  
Luckmann, Thomas 13  
Lüdtke, Alf 88  
Luhmann, Niklas 112  
Lührmann, Anna 122, 144, 145  
Lukashenko, Alexander 23, 74, 80, 81  
Luks, Leonid 11, 86  
Lundell, Krister 29  
Lust-Okar, Ellen 58, 82  
Luxemburg, Rosa 134
- M**
- MacFarquhar, Roderick 98  
Machiavelli, Niccolò 36, 147  
Madajczyk, Piotr 92  
Maduro, Nicolás 23  
Magaloni, Beatriz 114, 117  
Maier, Charles S. 134  
Maier, Hans 90  
Makarenko, Boris I. 81  
Makarov, Igor Viktorovich 60  
Maldonado, Claudia 124  
Mänicke-Gyöngyösi, Krisztina 131  
Mann, Michael 14  
Mannewitz, Tom 144  
Mannheim, Karl 71  
Mao Zedong 22, 74, 82, 83, 89, 91, 98, 100, 131  
Marcos, Ferdinand 46, 49, 53, 55, 57, 59, 60, 108, 127  
Mareš, Miroslav 130  
Marquês de Pombal, Sebastião José de Carvalho e Mello 62

Marshall, Monty G. 25, 33  
Marx, Karl 89, 90  
Matthes, Claudia-Yvette 130  
Max III. Joseph (Bavaria) 62  
Mayring, Philip A. E. 22  
Mazarin, Jules 61  
Maćków, Jerzy 11, 71, 104, 114, 130  
McEwen-Fial, Susan 147  
McFaul, Michael 145  
McGlinchey, Eric 56, 59  
Medvedev, Dmitry Anatolyevich 122  
Meier, Mischa 105  
Meister, Stefan 81  
Meng, Anne 58, 71  
Menne, Albert 19  
Merceron, Frantz 58  
Merkel, Wolfgang 16, 41, 45, 71,  
104–106, 121, 122, 124, 131, 141  
Meuschel, Sigrid 88, 92, 110  
Mijares, Primitivo 108, 109  
Mill, John Stuart 21  
Mobutu Sese Seko 53, 60  
Modi, Narendra 143  
Modrow, Hans 136–141  
Mohammed bin Salman 67  
Mohammed V. (Morocco) 65  
Möll, Marc-Pierre 87  
Mommsen, Hans 83, 95, 100, 109  
Mommsen, Margareta 83  
Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de 36–38,  
43, 49, 98, 143  
Moore, Clement H. 79  
Morales, Evo 146  
Moreau, Patrick 136, 138, 145  
Morsi, Mohammed 78  
Moustafa, Tamir 82  
Mozaffari, Mehdi 93  
Mudde, Cas 145  
Mugabe, Robert 119  
Müller, Dominik M. 66  
Mumay, Bulent 126  
Münkler, Herfried 19, 20, 92  
Muno, Wolfgang 55, 125, 147  
Murillo, Rosario 127  
Musharraf, Pervez 78

N

Naguib, Rabia 65  
Napoleon Bonaparte 69, 70, 115  
Navumava, Svjatlana 81  
Nawalny, Alexei 109, 118  
Neukom, William H. 26  
Neumann, Sigmund 87, 88  
Nicholls, David 54, 58  
Nicolet, Claude 36  
Nippel, Wilfried 36  
Niyazov, Saparmurat 46, 50, 53–56, 59  
Noesselt, Nele 74  
Nohlen, Dieter 76, 79, 116  
Nordlinger, Eric A. 76  
Nur-tegin, Kanybek 59

O

Ó Beacháin, Donnacha 54, 56  
O'Donnell, Guillermo 76  
Oberreuter, Heinrich 20  
Obiang, Teodoro 46  
Obinger, Herbert 146  
Offe, Claus 130  
Oldenburg, Fred 141  
Ooyen, Robert van 116  
Opitz, Peter J. 87  
Oppenheim, Lois Hecht 76  
Orbán, Viktor 144, 145  
Ortega, Daniel 127, 146  
Overy, Richard 95, 99, 114

P

Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza 49  
Panreck, Isabelle-Christine 144  
Pareto, Vilfredo 147  
Parsons, Talcott 14, 15  
Patzelt, Werner J. 11, 13, 46, 88, 136  
Payne, Stanley 78  
Penn, Alfred Wayne 46  
Pereira, Anthony 82  
Persak, Krzysztof 100  
Pétain, Philippe 124  
Peter Leopold (Tuscany) 62  
Petersen, Jens 86  
Pfaff, Stephen 135

## Index of Names

---

Philip II (Spain, Habsburg) 61  
Pickel, Gert 20, 22, 106  
Pickel, Susanne 17, 22  
Piekalkiewicz, Jaroslaw 46  
Pingel-Schliemann, Sandra 118  
Plamper, Jan 53  
Plato 35  
Plutarch 19  
Pohlmann, Tilman 19  
Polese, Abel 11, 54, 56  
Popieliński, Pawel 92  
Postert, André 96  
Potemkin, Grigory Alexandrovich 46, 54  
Powell, G. Bingham 14, 15, 103, 124  
Przeworski, Adam 21, 22, 27, 29, 31, 32,  
44, 80, 82, 117, 124, 144  
Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich 23, 73, 74,  
80–83, 91, 109, 113, 114, 119, 122,  
145

## Q

Qaboos bin Said, Sayyid (Oman) 66

## R

Rainer, Ilia 56  
Ranger, Terence 108  
Rashid, Ahmed 93  
Raymond, Claude 27, 56, 71, 89  
Rebentisch, Dieter 95  
Reinhard, Wolfgang 113  
Rennig, Christoph 139  
Repucci, Sarah 143  
Richards, David L. 25  
Richelieu, Armand-Jean du Plessis, duc  
de 61  
Richter, Melvin 22  
Richter, Michael 135  
Richter, Thomas 67  
Riegel, Klaus-Georg 113  
Riker, William 16  
Roberts, David D. 93, 131  
Robespierre, Maximilien de 140  
Robinson, James A. 16, 44  
Roessler, Philip G. 115  
Roll, Stephen 67  
Roller, Edeltraud 24

Rose-Ackerman, Susan 59  
Rosiny, Stephen 67, 93  
Rotberg, Robert I. 113  
Roth, Günther 50  
Rotteck, Carl von 85  
Rüb, Friedbert 133  
Rummel, Rudolph J. 99  
Río, Adrián del 114  
Rød, Espen Geelmuyden 118

## S

Safiyev, Rail 54  
Saint-Simon, Henri de 85  
Salman, Mohammed bin 67, 68  
Sandhu, Swaran 15  
Sandschneider, Eberhard 103, 122  
Santoro, Lorenzo 11  
Sartori, Giovanni 46, 79, 128  
Sassoon, Joseph 22, 72, 127  
Saud, Muhammad bin 65  
Sauer, Wolfgang 114, 123, 125, 147  
Savonarola, Girolamo 85  
Schäfer, Michael 87  
Scharpf, Fritz W. 72  
Schedler, Andreas 58, 79–81, 114, 116,  
132  
Scheppele, Kim Lane 125  
Scherbakowa, Irina 100  
Scheugenpflug, Martin 139  
Sieder, Wolfgang 96  
Schirmer, Roland 136  
Schlangen, Walter 87  
Schlumberger, Oliver 52, 65  
Schluß, Henning 97  
Schmeitzner, Mike 12, 88, 91  
Schmid, Bruno 37  
Schmidmayr, Michael 66  
Schmidt, Dirk 83  
Schmidt, Friedrich 73  
Schmidt, Manfred G. 11  
Schmidt, Renate 94  
Schmiechen-Ackermann, Detlef 19, 20, 44  
Schmotz, Alexander 132, 147  
Schneckener, Ulrich 113  
Schröder, Wilhelm Heinz 19

- Schroeder, Klaus 134  
Schulz, Gerhard 123, 125  
Schumpeter, Joseph Alois 44  
Schuschnigg, Kurt 70  
Semushin, Dmitry 74  
Shah, Aqil 78  
Shekhovtsov, Anton 24  
Sheline, Annelle R. 68  
Shih, Lea 83, 116  
Shlapentokh, Vladimir 129  
Shorten, Richard 90  
Shum, Desmond 109  
Siaroff, Alan 71, 133, 143  
Siebenmorgen, Peter 139  
Silitski, Vitali 81  
Simpser, Alberto 22  
Skaaning, Svend-Erik 122, 144  
Skocpol, Theda 118  
Slipowitz, Amy 143  
Smend, Rudolf 116, 117  
Smith, Alastair 16, 22, 79  
Smith, Benjamin 16, 22, 79  
Snyder, Richard 57  
Soest, Christian 75  
Somoza, Anastasio 49, 55, 127  
Soylu, Süleyman 126  
Spector, Regine A. 145  
St. Fleur, François 58  
Stalin, Joseph 19, 53, 89, 95, 98–100, 128  
Stefes, Christoph 106  
Stehnken, Franziska 112  
Stepan, Alfred 20, 50, 88, 116, 127–129, 134  
Stepan, Matthias 20, 50, 88, 116, 127–129, 134  
Stepun, Fedor 86  
Stone, Dan 99, 100  
Stoph, Willi 136  
Stempel, Dieter 139  
Strittmatter, Kai 97, 131  
Sturzo, Luigi 86, 87, 124  
Stykow, Petra 58, 80–82  
Sulla, Lucius Cornelius 36, 69  
Süß, Winfried 19  
Svolik, Milan W. 78, 114  
Szczerbiak, Aleks 145  
**T**  
Taggart, Paul 145  
Talib, Naimah S. 66  
Talmon, Jacob L. 91  
Tanneberg, Dag 106  
Tansey, Oisín 147  
Teorell, Jan 39, 45, 47, 76–79  
Teune, Henry 21, 22  
Thaa, Winfried 130  
Thaler, Kai M. 127  
Thamer, Hans-Ulrich 95  
Thaysen, Uwe 136, 138–140  
Thiel, Jens 10, 99  
Thiel, Markus 10, 99  
Thieme, Tom 62–65, 67, 68  
Thiery, Peter 11, 93, 110, 125  
Thießen, Malte 19  
Thomas Aquinas 36  
Thompson, Mark R. 53, 57, 59, 109, 127, 131  
Tibi, Bassam 93  
Timasheff, Nikolay S. 86  
Tocqueville, Alexis de 122  
Tokatlı, Mahir 126  
Tomini, Luca 144  
Trebbi, Francesco 56  
Trubetzkoy, Nikolay S. 86  
Trujillo, Rafael Leónidas 49, 53, 57, 58  
Trujillo, Ramfis 49, 53, 57, 58  
Trump, Donald 10, 73, 125, 144, 145  
Trutkowski, Dominik 121  
Tsebelis, George 123  
Tucker, Robert C. 78, 94  
Tulloch, Gordon 15, 22, 114, 115  
Turchetti, Mario 36, 49, 61, 69  
Turner, Thomas 54  
**U**  
Ulrichsen, Kristian Coates 68  
**V**  
Vanderhill, Rachel 146  
Vanhanen, Tatu 26, 29, 113  
Vargas, Getúlio 70

## Index of Names

---

Verba, Sidney 15, 104  
Vodička, Karel 134  
Voegelin, Eric 87, 89, 105  
Völkel, Evelyn 93  
Vollnhals, Clemens 12, 20  
Voslensky, Michael S. 116  
Vreeland, James Raymond 27, 29, 76

### W

Wachsmann, Klaus 100  
Wagener, Hans-Jürgen 16, 121  
Wahdat-Hagh, Wahied 94  
Wahhab, Muhamad bin Abdul 65  
Wahman, Michael 76–78  
Walle, Nicolas van de 56  
Way, Lucan A. 79–81, 115, 118, 119, 132  
Weber, Max 13–15, 18, 41, 46, 49, 50,  
109, 111, 112  
Weeks, Jessica L 113  
Weidmann, Nils B. 118  
Weil, Francesca 139  
Weingast, Barry R. 16  
Weinke, Annette 139  
Weis, Eberhard 61  
Welcker, Karl Theodor 85  
Wendt, Hartmut 135  
Wentker, Hermann 44  
Werth, Nicolas 98  
Werz, Nicholas 76  
Weyland, Kurt 18, 146  
Whitehead, Laurence 146  
Whitmore, Sarah 81  
Wiederkehr, Stefan 86  
Wiest, Margarete 83, 114

Wilson, Andrew 74  
Wilson, Tim 74  
Winters, Peter Jochen 75, 82, 139  
Wintrobe, Ronald 15, 16, 22  
Wolf, Eric R. 49, 62  
Wolf, Sebastian 49, 62  
Wolle, Stefan 137  
Wood, Geoffrey 32, 46  
Wood, Reed 32, 46  
Wright, Joseph 27, 57, 76, 82  
Wu, Hongda Harry 100  
Wurster, Stefan 106  
Wüstemeyer, Manfred 70

### X

Xi Jinping 73, 74, 83, 109, 116, 131, 147

### Y

Yeltsin, Boris 73, 81, 83, 109, 114, 133  
Yoon, Jiwon 11, 97  
Young-Bruehl, Elisabeth 98  
Young, Crawford 54, 98

### Z

Zapponi, Niccolò 96  
Zehnpfennig, Barbara 89  
Zenz, Adrian 132  
Ziblatt, Daniel 10, 144  
Ziemer, Klaus 130  
Zikhanouskaya, Svyatlana 81  
Zimmermann, Hartmut 134  
Zitelmann, Rainer 89  
Zumbrägel, Tobias 146