Crisis? What Crisis?

In the mid-1960s, Western decision-makers felt that NATO had reached a crossroad. This impression was precipitated by the question of President Charles de Gaulle"s intentions with respect to the French role in NATO, but also reflected more deep-seated issues. The search for a new meaning for NATO in an era of decreasing East-West tensions, renewed European strength, and individual commitments outside of the treaty area ultimately resulted in an overall process of intra-alliance bargaining. This study addresses the different alliance concepts and policies of selected NATO states and investigates the influence wielded by small allies and institutional actors, such as NATO secretaries-general and ambassadors, in the re-orientation of the Atlantic alliance. Drawing on newly available sources from the NATO archives and archives in the United States, Canada, Britain, Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands, the book identifies the actors who perceived NATO to be in crisis, and shows why; it also investigates the ensuing political initiatives, strategies for coping with the new situation, and their policy impact. The study concludes that the smooth absorption of the French withdrawal from NATO"s military arm in 1966 was eased by previous multilateral and institutional debates and the collective response to the challenge since 1963.