Der autoritative Charakter der Grundrechtsabwägung

The relationship between decision-making competences of the legislator and the supervisory power of the constitutional jurisdiction is one of the most controversial fields in law theory. During the last thirty years the theory of principles aimed to solve this problem. Nevertheless copious objections have been raised against this pursue. One of these objections claims that the theory of principles presents a threat for the authority of the legislator in favour of the constitutional judge and that the balancing analysis, which is central for the theory of principles, is an irrational and subjective procedure that also weakens the rule of law in favour of a judicial activism.
Does the democratic state under the rule of law really face a threat due to the theory of principles and the balancing of constitutional rights?
The book aims to develop an answer to this question by analyzing the rationality of the balancing procedure as well as the role of the formal principles in the structure of the balancing.