Die Beeinflussung aktienrechtlicher Corporate Governance durch das Bankaufsichtsrecht

Numerous reforms of banking supervisory law have caused a two-pronged corporate governance system. On the one hand, there are detailed sector-specific requirements, on the other hand, vague general requirement. This leads to the central question of this survey: How do these regulatory complexes influence each other? Do banking supervisory requirements on corporate governance leave the general ones unaffected or do they substantiate them? To answer these questions, the survey fleshes out the nebulous concept of the »spill-over effect«. It places spill-over effects into the methodology of interpretation, carves out their conditions and defines them. Subsequently, the survey investigates whether a spill-over of banking supervisory law is generally possible. Finally, it applies the developed methodology of the influence on the specific banking supervisory requirements with respect to executive remuneration.