Die methodengerechte Auflösung marktmachtbedingter Interessenkonflikte durch § 19 Abs. 2 Nr. 1 GWB

At least since the beginning of the digital revolution and the associated concentration tendencies in many markets, antitrust control of market power has become increasingly important. For economic reasons alone, however, market power must not be penalised, but must be seen as an ambivalent phenomenon. There is no methodical alternative to a competition-oriented balancing of interests. However, it exposes antitrust law practice and science to an (apparent) casuistry of individual cases. The mandate addressed to them can therefore only be: rationality through method. Building on a methodological and legal foundation, the author takes on this task. He develops a balancing structure that fits into the system of market power control with its implications for contract theory and competition economics. Within this grid, as a review of the current situation shows, the BGH's [Federal Court of Justice] ruling practice on Section 19 (2) no. 1 GWB can be described as consistent.
The work was awarded with the 2019 faculty award of the ­University of Kiel.