Die neue Marktinfrastruktur im OTC Derivatehandel

In response to the recent global financial crisis, in 2009 the G20 agreed on the introduction of a mandatory clearing requirement for over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives through a central counterparty (CCP) by the end of 2012. In this study, the author examines this new market infrastructure and its resilience in times of crisis. While doing so, he focuses on the relationship between law and financial (in)stability and adopts some key findings from academic analyses of the crisis. This reveals that the rigid enforcement of (financial) contracts in times of crisis may destabilise the financial system. As a result, the binding effect of contractual agreements such as margin calls—implemented as a safety mechanism—must be relaxed, if necessary. This situation is aggravated by the design of CCPs as they concentrate the risks of the OTC derivatives market and have thus become systemically important nodes. In addition, the author identifies reverse interests within the clearing system to the detriment of financial stability. Ultimately, he proposes the modification of the current system by integrating the CCP into a public–private partnership.