Directors' Dealings

This study is the first to analyze the implications of the Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) on managers’ transactions in detail. The MAR tightens the restrictions on managers’ transactions set forth by the European capital markets law considerably.
The focus of this thesis lies on the strict prohibition of managers‘ transactions during the closed periods introduced by Art. 19 para. 11 MAR that apply prior to the publication of financial results. It evaluates this provision in the context of the other insider dealing regulations and provides a comparative legal analysis. Owing to the failed implementation of a RINGA approach on the European level, the closed periods constitute a time-limited paradigm shift and as such a foreign body in the MAR.
The practical application of the new provisions, particularly Art. 19 para. 11 MAR, raises numerous questions. The study addresses and answers these whilst presenting suggestions for the improvement of the existing shortcomings it identifies.