Insolvenzverschleppungshaftung und Gläubigerschutz in der Insolvenzkrise

This book is a comparative examination of whether the US Directors’ Tort of Deepening Insolvency is a suitable alternative to the German and Greek directors’ liability for delayed filing for insolvency. It also challenges the deterrent effect of liability as an instrument to control directors’ behavior and further demonstrates that it is inefficient when used as a means of counteracting the delayed filing for insolvency. The background is that insolvency is rather a psychological than a legal problem. Moreover, in terms of creditors’ protection, there is enough reason to consider other incentives to motivate managers to react earlier to crisis instead of persisting as long as possible and delaying the initiation of insolvency proceedings. In this regard, the incentive of early rehabilitation by a stand-alone pre-insolvency restructuring process is considered.