Kollektive Marktbeherrschung: Neue Industrieökonomik und Erfahrungen aus der Europäischen Fusionskontrolle

The case practice of European merger control shows that the proving of collective market dominance involves considerable methodological problems. At present, the procedures of the anti-trust authorities are being questioned by the research results of the "New Industrial Economics", with its pronounced game-theoretical orientation. This book, which is based on a study conducted for the European Commission, examines this new approach by "new industrial economics" research in the light of selected decisions based on the Merger Control Regulation.
The results clearly show that game-theoretical research with its behaviourally oriented view of the oligopoly situation indeed opens up new perspectives for judging the probability of collusion, but that the analysis of market structural factors still remains the basis for the judgement. The book contains a comprehensive examination of factors inhibiting or supporting collusion, taking concrete cases under the European Merger Control Regulation as examples. It can be recommended to those who wish a comprehensible presentation of recent research results and a presentation of the decisions pertaining to the investigation of collective market dominance.
n in German with an English summary