Leerintentionen und leere Namen

The book contains a monograph study on Husserl's notion of empty intentionality. The function of empty intentions is illustrated for the phenomenological theories of meaning, perception and inner time consciousness. Signitive and intuitive intentions can be grouped into different classes according to the question of their potential fulfilment. The categories of intentions that can be ideally fulfilled or are impossible to fulfil are of particular interest for the analysis of empty intentions. Intentions that are impossible to fulfil are of central importance for the phenomenological theory of intentionality, both for the theory of meaning and for the theory of perception. Just as the absurd object of signitive intentions lies beyond the realm of the factual and ideally realisable, it is also impossible to intuitively conceptualise the object for external perception completely.
In addition, the phenomenological notion of empty meaning-intention is brought into association with the semantics of empty names in analytical philosophy. Phenomenology and logical semantics assume different object notions in their analysis of names. Even in cases where no object actually corresponds to the expressions, Husserl maintains that the distinction between the three semantic levels of the symbol, the meaning and the object must be upheld.
An examination of the Follesdal approach leads to the realisation that the semantics of propositional attitudes do not represent a suitable interpretative framework for the analysis of empty intentions. The thesis is supported that the problem of fictional and absurd expressions must be dealt with within the context of the semantics of performative modes. Parallels to the theory of the modified thetic character of an act developed by Husserl to deal with these expressions can be found in the theories of existential presuppositions and existential quantifiers.