Husserls Begriff der 'Hyle' aus der Perspektive der Lebensphänomenologie

This work approaches the factual side of transcendental subjectivity via the term ‘hyle’ in Husserl’s phenomenology. The various meanings and functions that are linked to this term in Husserl’s work are exposed as well as the many aporias that are associated with it. Two other authors play a particularly important role: Michel Henry and Max Scheler. Henry’s criticism of Husserl’s ‘hyle’ makes it possible to note a flaw in Husserl’s conception, for which an attempt is then made along Scheler’s anthropologically-based reflections on how this defect could be remedied. The two authors work out respectively the non-intentional dimension of our conscious life in confrontation with Husserl’s ‘hyle’ doctrine. Finally, the question becomes relevant to what extent under the term ‘hyle’ the factual sphere, which one calls ‘reality,’ just hides itself from the intentional reflexive gaze.